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THE FEDERAL COURTS AS GUARDIANS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
A somewhat vague opinion pervades the public mind, that the
Federal Courts, and, in particular, the Supreme Court, form a
firm bulwark of important political and civil rights, and a guarantee against aggressions from the executive and the legislative
branches of the government. It is the object of this article to call attention to some considerations which tend to qualify the value of this
guarantee.
It i' in the first place to be remembered that all the courts owe
their existence and almost all their jurisdiction to congress. The only
courts named in the constitution are the Supreme Court, and "such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish." It is quite beyond dispute, that courts which owe their existence to congress, can be abolished by it, with the one possible qualification, that they cannot be abolished during the lives of the existing
incumbents. The judges even of the inferior courts, are to hold their
office during good behavior, and it might be contended, were an effort
made to abolish their offices, that such abolition was made impossible
by this provision concerning their tenure. But nothing prevents congress from doing what it did in the case even of the Supreme Court, by
the Act of July 2 3 rd, 1866, viz., from providing that when a vacancy
shall occur upon the bench, it shall not be filled. By this process, in
due time, the court would disappear.
It is evident, indeed, that although the constitution mentions
"one Supreme Court," such a court could not come into existence without the co operation of congress, the president and the senate. Congress must determine of how many judges the court shall be composed,
the qualifications which they shall possess, the compensation which they
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shall receive. And having thus determined how many judges shall
form it, the appointment of judges depends upon the co-operation of
the executive and the senate. In a vital sense, therefore, all the courts
of the United States may be said to be congressional courts. The first
Supreme Court was composed of a Chief Justice and five associates.
The number reached its maximum under the Act of March 3rd, 1863,
which provided for nine associates. The power retained by congress
over this court was illustrated by the Act of i866, already mentioned,
which provided that vacancies occurring in it should not be filled until
the number of associate justices should be reduced to six. Under this
act, the court was reduced by the death of Justices Catron and Wayne
to seven associates, when on April ioth, 1869, the Act of i866, was repealed and the appointment of an eighth associate was authorized. It
is evident that the number of judges might have been still further reduced, and it is improbable that, when reduced to two or one judge,
the court thus diminished in influence would have pronounced unconstitutional a law forbidding appointments to any vacancies in it whatever. Besides, should such a law be passed, and the president or the
senate refuse, in conformity with it, to assist in the appointment to the
vacancies, it is not conceivable how the Supreme Court could compel
the former to nominate and the latter to advise and consent to the appointment.
But, such heroic measures, on the part of congress, to escape the
trammels of the Federal Courts, are entirely unnecessary. Even
though the courts indefeasibly existed, i. e., the judges and their titles,
all that makes them truly courts, may, with a slight exception, be
taken from them by congress. The constitution' gives to the Supreme
Court, when it is brought into existence by congress, jurisdiction in
"all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
and those in which a state shall be a party," and this jurisdiction,
which is original, cannot be increased 2 nor diminished by congress.
Upon this court the constitution in form confers appellate jurisdiction,
but by subjecting it to "such exceptions" and "such regulations," as
the congress shall make, its appellate jurisdiction is in fact conferred
by congress. 3 In 1882, a review of the action of the circuit court
of the District of Columbia in a criminal case was declined because
"this court has no appellate jurisdiction confided to it in criminal cases,
by the laws of the United States" 4 and on a civil appeal, from the Circuit Court for Virginia, in 1796, Ellsworth, C. J., declared "If congress
1 Art. III, Sect. 2, cl. 2.

2 Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch. 137.
3

In Durousseau v. U. S., 6 Cr. 307, Marshall, C. J., said "The appellate

powers of this court are not given by the judicial act. They are given by
the constitution. But they are limited and regulated by the judicial act."

45 lEx parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38.
Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 Dall. 321. The Francis Wright, 105 U. S. 381.
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has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise
an appellate jurisdiction, and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart
from it. The question, therefore, on the constitutional point of an appellate jurisdiction, is simply, whether congress has established any
rule for regulating its exercise." Should congress therefore become
dissatisfied with the manner in which the Supreme Court has exercised,
or is about to exercise, any portion of its appellate jurisdiction, that
bpdy may disarm it of so much of this jurisdiction as it may choose.
A startling illustration of this power of congress and of the uses to
which it may be put, is furnished by the McCardle case.' McCardle
had been arrested in Mississippi, and was held for trial by a military
commission, under the Reconstruction Act, upon charges of disturbing
the peace, of inciting to insurrection, disorder and violence, of libel
and of impeding reconstruction. He sued out a habeas corpius, in
obedience to which Major General Gillem made a return of the causes
of his imprisonment, and surrendered McCardle to the marshal. Subsequently the court remanded him to the custody of Gillem, and he thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court. A motion was made in this court to
dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, but, after argument, was
disallowed, the court finding in the Act of Congress of February 5th,
1867, the gift of jurisdiction. On the 2d, 3d, 4 th, and 9th days of
March, 1868, the case was argued on the merits, and while it was being
held under advisement, the Act of March 27th, 1868, was introduced,
passed, vetoed, and repassed, whereby so much of the Act of February
5 th, 1867, as authorized an appeal from the Circuit Court to the
Supreme Court "or the exercise of any such jurisdiction by said
Supreme Court, on appeals which have been, or may hereafter be
taken," was repealed. This act being brought to the notice of
the court, McCardle's appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
and he thereby fell back into the hands of the military court for trial.
The argument of the court is, that the description of the appellate
jurisdiction by the Act of September 24, 1789, is an implied negation
of all other, and that, in addition, the Act of March 27th, 1868, is an
express negation of the jurisdiction on appeal in the particular case be2
fore the court.
The object of congress in these enactments is indisputable. Either
it apprehended a decision adverse to the Reconstruction Act, over which
congress had waged a fierce war with the president, or it understood
from the court, or some members of it, that they did not desire to be
constrained to pronounce an opinion. Indeed, as prudent men, they
did well, if their decision was about to be adverse to congress, to
avoid collision with it. That body was sternly committed to the
IEx parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318; 7 Wall. 506.
2Xxpress negation it was not. It was a repeal of an act conferring the
jurisdiction.
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maintenance of its policy. It had triumphantly brushed aside the opposition of the president. It was in no mood to brook obstruction
from the Supreme Court. The power of impeachment was in its
hands, and that it might employ that power, the event too plainly
showed.
Let us pause for a moment to consider the gravity of the phenomenon just referred to. The acts of congress concerning reconstruction
displaced the state institutions, its legislature, its courts ; substituted
the reign of the soldier for that of the civilian; projected into the state,
criminal and civil laws not enacted by its duly constituted organs;
haled men for trial before occasional courts composed of military men,
deprived the accused of trial by jury, of the privilege of not being put
on trial at all, except on the presentment or indictment of a grand
jury. Some of the most precious rights guaranteed in the constitution
were denied by it. The cessation of the rebellion had been proclaimed
on August 2oth, 1866. If the occasion could ever come when rights
most sacred and invaluable were seemingly imperiled and when the
action of the Supreme Court, declaring and enforcing these rights
against legislative usurpation, was indispensable, it had come in Mississippi in 1867 and 1868. But the same congress whose acts were to
be brought to the bar of the constitution for judgment, had the power
to render the judge voiceless and impotent. By a breath, it stripped
him of his faculty to aid the citizen. The president was unable, for
congress possessed the necessary majority to overcome his vetoes.
The Supreme Court was rendered unable, for its jurisdiction depended
on the grace of congress.
It may be recalled that the only power which the Supreme Court
holds without the consent of congress, is that over cases affecting the
representatives of foreign power, and cases in which a state is a party,
and these are cases which can never interest many people, or affect
Hardly any of such cases could involve the
vital personal rights.
questions which most deeply concern the citizen of the United States.
One result of this dependence of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court on congress is, that congress is rendered free from constitutional restraints in its government of the territories. There is no
consensus of opinion among jurists, or publicists, as to whether the
constitution guards the right of the people of the territories. These
people have no political rights, although these have been said to be
preservative of all others.' They can be governed by laws in whose
making they have no voice, by executives not depending for their
offices upon their consent, by judges who are appointed by an extraneous power. The independence of judges, conceived to be so necessary a security of right in England and the states of the United
I Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.
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States, is denied in the territories. The power of an exterior government to tax in the territories, is not only as plenary as that claimed by
parliament over the American Colonies, but it has been exercised on
a large scale, from the very foundation of the government, to the
present, while that asserted by Parliament had not been exercised until shortly before the Revolution.
Even if the constitution did guarantee personal rights in the territories, it must always be remembered that the constitution is not
made by the people of the territories. The states have made it. They
can alter it. If they choose, they can withdraw all existing restrictions
upon their government, in dealing with the territories and possessions.
The territories are, theoretically and practically, in the absolute control of the United States, or of the states, for what power over them is
not now possessed by the former, can at any time be granted by the
latter, since the United States has come into existence and obtained
all the powers it now has, from the states, and whatever powers it has
not, abide with the states or (the same thing) the people of the states,
If the present government of the United
as political communities.
States is not quite absolute in the territories, the people of the several
states, as political communities, may at any time make it so, and a
government which can, conformably to the existing constitution, be
made absolute by an external people, at any time, may well be considered as absolute to-day.
But even if the powers of the government in the territories are
defined and restrained by the constitution, the authoritative interpretation of that instrument abides with the government itself. In the first
instance, congress and the president say what these constitutional
powers are. After them, the Supreme Court may pronounce a judgment on the same question. But these are all foreign to the people of
the territories, the court no less than the congress. The court is coniposed of prominent men, lawyers, politicians, former members of the
Senate or the House, who are citizens of the states, and share such
absolutist tendencies of their fellow-citizens, with respect to the territories, as may exist. It may be conceded that the chance is somewhat
greater, that the people of the territories will obtain the benefit of the
constitution, if their right thereto is to be determined at the last resort,
by the court, than it would be, had congress the final word; without
by any means conceding that the people of the territories hold any
right except at the will of the imperial people who speak from Washington, for that will speaks when the court pronounces a judgment, no
less than when cougress promulges a statute.
This leads me to'the point I intended to make, viz., that by controlling the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, congress may
exempt itself from all judgment concerning its powers over the territories, by refusing to confer on that court, the right to hear appeals
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fromn the courts of the territories. The territorial courts are creatures
of congress. The terms of their judges are short. They can be made
removable within the term. If they pronounce distasteful judgments,
they can be disciplined.
New judges can be appointed, who will
prove more tractable. Nor would it be too much to say that disagreeable judgments may be set aside by legislative decree. Their jurisdiction could be so limited by congress, that they could entertain no
question of the constitutionality of its enactments. By stripping the
Supreme Court of power to hear appeals from territorial decisions, the
whole administration of government in the territories would be in
legislative hands.
But congress controls not merely the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. It creates all the other courts, and all the jurisdiction
of such other courts. The possible jurisdiction of these courts is described in Article III of the constitution, but the actual jurisdiction is
only so much of the possible as congress chooses to confer. Civil jurisdiction could be conferred, and not criminal, or vice versa. Jurisdiction over cases not involving certain questions might be granted, while,
over others involving such questions, it might be withheld. Thus, a
federal court might receive jurisdiction, in cases involving the constitutionality of a state law, and might be denied jurisdiction in cases
involving that of a federal law, or, the jurisdiction might be caused to
lapse, so soon as it should appear to the court that such a question was
presented for discussion, for, if congress can withdraw jurisdiction
after it has attached, by an act passed pending the action, we see no
good reason fordenying its power in advance to condition the jurisdiction on its not involving any constitutional question.
It must be remembered that the power of the state courts to decide on federal questions may also be taken away by congress. " The
judicial power (of the "United States) shall extend to all cases, in law
or equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority."
1
Congress, says Cooley, "may apportion among the several federal
courts all the judicial power of the United States, or it may apportion
a part only, and in that case, what is not apportioned will be left to
be exercised by the courts of the states. Thus the states may have a
limited jurisdiction within the sphere of the judicial power of the
United States, but subject to be further limited or wholly taken away
by subsequent federal legislation. ,,2
As Congress may withdraw
jurisdiction over Federal questions from the state courts and bestow it
on Federal courts, it could do the former, without, at the same time,
doing the latter. We think it clear that by its control over the jurisI Article III.

2 Constit. Law, 124.
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diction, with respect to cases arising under the constitution, laws and
treaties, it can protect itself from a decision of the courts adyerse to its
legislation, in all cases except those touching the representatives of
foreign powers, and those in which a state is a party, and even in respedt to such cases, when they do not originate in the Supreme Court.
Practically, then, there is a right to review the legislation of the congress, and bring it to accountability to the constitution, only so far as
congress chooses that there shall be. The decision of congress, in
every enactment, is final if congress will have it so.
Besides this direct control over the jurisdiction of the court, congress may occasionally affect its decisions by affecting the composition
Judges cannot' be put from the bench because their
of the court.
views are ungrateful to the political departments, except through the
clumsy and difficult process. of impeachment, but what is to hinder the
increase of the number of seats on the bench, and filling them with
friends of the legislation, in such numbers as to overcome its antagonists ? One striking illustration of the use which may be made of this
power is given us in the Legal Tender Cases.I The case of Hepburn
v. Griswold 2 involving the constitutionality of the legal tender act
with respect to antecedent contracts was argued before the Supreme
Court in 1867. It was reargued in 1868, at the instance of the attorney
general of the United States, Mr. Stanbery. Before the announcement
of the decision, congress, onApril ioth, 1869, passed an act, to take
effect on the first Monday of December following, authorizing the appointment of an additional justice, and repealing the Act of July 2 3 d,
1866, which directed that vacancies occurring in the court should not
be filled until the number of associate justices was reduced to six.
The
The number of associates had, at that time, fallen to seven.
effect of the two provisions would be to make the number of associates
eight. On the 7th day of February, 1870, the decision in Hepburn v.
Griswold was announced3 declaring the legal tender act, in regard to
debts created previously to its enactment, unconstitutional. On Dec.
I5th, 1869, Justice Grier resigned, his resignation to take effect the
On the day on which the decision was anfollowing February.
nounced, the names of Bradley and Strong were sent to the senate by
President Grant. Both of these gentlemen were known to favor the
constitutionality of the legal tender law, Strong, J., having, as justice
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Shollenberger v.
Brinton, 4 decided, in 1866, that the law was constitutional. Almost
as soon as these gentlemen had received their commissions, the attorney general made a motion that two cases from the Court of Claims
1 2 Wall, 682.
2 8 Wall, 603.
3 The case was

decided in conference Nov. 27th, 1869, and on Jan. 29th,
1870, the opinion of the Chief Justice was directed to be read.
4

52 Pa. 9.
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be set down for argument, and that the legal tender question be reconsidered.
These cases being subsequently withdrawn from the
record, the cases of Knox v. Lee, and Parker v. Davis,' presenting
the same question, came up for consideration, and the former decision
in Hepburn v. Griswold, was overruled.
Chief Justice Chase, and
Clifford, Field and Nelson,justices, who had been of the majority of
five, in the decision now reversed, dissenting 2 , the new majority of
five contained the two new justices.
It would be absurd to suppose that justice Grier resigned, in order
to make a vacancy that could be filled by a justice who would unite
with the minority in Hepburn v. Griswold, in overthrowing, in some
later case, the principle of that decision. It is not absurd to suppose
that one of the motives of congress in adding one to the number of
judges existing on April ioth, 1869, was to make it possible should
the court be equally divided in Hepburn v. Griswold, to secure a
majority in favor of the cdnstitutionality of the act. Whatever the
motive for creating the 8th associatejusticeship, it is entirely clear that
the acceptableness to the appointing power of the justices selected for
the vacancies, was dependent inter alia upon theirviews on the question
then agitating statesmen, and the public. 3
However this may be, the case suggests how, when the congress
and the president are in harmony, they may, if they wish, procure decisions upon questions which interest them, of the kind desired. If five
judges were known to incline in one direction, and four in the other,
it would be easy to increase the seats on the bench from nine to eleven,
and then to find the nominees who possessed the proper tendencies and
views.
In some ways this method is better, it less scandalizes the
public, and less weakens the respect for the qourts, than to wait until a
decision is rendered and then seek to overthrow it by a partial reconstitution of the courts. It is infinitely better than to allow a series of decisions in one sense, and then long afterwards, as in the Income Tax
Cases, to surprise the country, (a new court having been made by death
4
meantime) with a decision in a contrary sense.
1 The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457.

2 The other of the five was Justice Grier, whose resignation made the opportunity to put two new justices, instead of one, into the court. It had been
understood that Grier, J., agreed with the dissenters, until the time came for
the decision in conference.
8 Carson says "the utmost excitement prevailed in the public mind immediately after the announcement of the decision, and it was not long before
it became generally understood that an effort would be made to secure a reconsideration of the judgment." Hist. Sup. Ct. U. S. p. 449. The author repudiates the charge that the Supreme Court was "packed. "' His facts may
cast doubt as to the motive of congress in adding a member to the Supreme
Court. They do not tend to show that President Grant's selection of Bradley
and Strong was not in part determined by their known views on the legal
tender law.
4 Cf. Springer v. Un'ted States, 102 U. S., 586; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.; 15 Supreme Court Rep. 673, 912.
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We proceed now to call attention to a self-limitation of their
powers, by the judges of the Supreme Court, whereby they may escape
the duty of annulling the acts of congress and of the executive department. We refer to the doctrine that the decision of political questions
is for the other departments of the government, and that when such
questions arise in causes litigated before the courts, the latter will not
investigate and determine them originally, but will simply ascertain
how they have been decided by the other departments, and will adopt
that decision.
It is desirable to ascertain, if we may, what is meant by a political
question. Unfortunately, we do not find in the opinions of the courts
any instructive definition of it, and more unfortunately we shall find
that the term is used in very different senses. In one sense, a political
question is one whose decision is to be made by the president or congress, and, when once made, is to be accepted by the courts. The
executive and legislative departments of the government, e.g. are to
determine whether any alleged political state is such, or is merely a
part of a larger state from which, though it has attempted, it has not
succeeded in separating. Thus, San Domingo having revolted from
France, and the war to suppress the rebellion still being prosecuted,
the question was, a vessel having been captured by French authoritits, and its cargo condemned and sold as a prize, whether French law
still operated over San Domingo, and if so, whether it validated the
sale. Marshall, C. J., remarks, " It is for the government to decide,
whether they will consider San Domingo as an independent nation, and
until such decision shall'be made, or France shall relinquish her claim,
courts of justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining
unaltered, and the sovereign power of France over that colony as still
subsisting." The president had heretofore recognized San Domingo as
French. Until he recognized it as no longer French, the courts must
ilisofacto regard it as French. ' Texas being in revolt against Mexico,
in order to raise money with which to secure an army to assist Texas,
Chambers, on September 16th, 1836, contracted to sell to Kennett a
tract of land in Texas, for $I2,5OO. After Texas had been admitted to
the Union, Kennett filed a bill for specific performance. Wasthe contract in violation of the law of nations? It was, if Texas was at the
time it was made, still a part of Mexico. It was contended by the
plaintiff that in fact Texas had become independent. Taney, C. J.,
1Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. 241. In Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, the question presented was whether that part of the island of San Domingo under the

government of Petion, and that part of it under the government of Christophe, were foreign states, to aid either of whom by vessels was in violation
of a Federal statute. San Domingo had been French Territory. Story, J.,
said that until our own government or the French government recognizedthe

new government, courts of justice were bound to consider the ancieht state of
things as remaining unaltered.
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answered by remarking that that was a question "for that department
of our government exclusively, which is charged with our foreign relations. And until the period when that department recognizes it as
an independent state, the judicial tribunals of the country were bound
to consider the old order of things as having continued, and to regard
Texas as a part of the Mexican territory." 1
The cases just cited were cases involving the success of revolution.
But the same principle is applicable, when the question is
merely whether a given territory is within the dominion of a certain
In an action for a marine policy, the declaration
foreign power.
averring loss of the vessel by its seizure by the government of Buenos
Ayres for engaging in the seal trade with the Falkland Islands, it was
material to know whether these islands were under the jurisdiction of
Buenos Ayres. The court held that the decision of this question-in
this case in the negative-by the executive department, expressed in
its correspondence, is concltisive upon the courts. The court will not
2
investigate it de"novo.
Whether a certain territory near the boundary of the United
States, is within the jurisdiction of the United States, or that of the
adjacent state, is a question that may arise in litigation between private
persons. Thus, in Foster v. Neilson, 3 the plaintiff claimed land
lying 30 miles east of the Mississippi in the district of Feliciana, in
what is now Louisiana, granted to him by Spanish authority on Jan.
2d, 1804. The defendant denied the validity of that grant, because
the territory was not Spanish, but American, having become such by
the cession to the United States by France, of the province of Louisiana. Marshall, C. J., intimating doubt whether the Spanish contention
that the territory in question had not passed by her cession in i8oo to
France, was not correct, refused to decide for himself, remarking "We
think, then, however individual judges might construe the treaty of
San Ildefonso, it is the province of the court to conform its decisions
to the will (not the judgment) of the legislature, if that will has been
Finding that congress had treated the territory in
clearly expressed."
question as American, the court held that it was not Spanish.
But, although the locality of an international boundary is a political question, i. e. a question to be decided for all the citizens of the
1 Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 244.
2 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415.

3 2 Pet. 253 Cf. United States v. Arrendondo, 6 Pet. 691. In Jones v.
United States, 137 U. S. 202, involving the question whether the island in
the Caribbean Sea, called Navassa, was within the jurisdiction of the United
States, the Supreme Court held that who is the sovereign is not a judicial,

but a political question, "the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government, conclusively binds the judges as
well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government." Ascertaining that the president had, under an act of congress, claimed the island,

the court was bound to treat it as within American jurisdiction.
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United States, and for its courts, by the executive and legislative departments, an inter-state boundary, or a boundary between a state and
territory of the United States, is not exclusively for the political departments. Whether Texas embraced what was &rected by it into
Grier county had been in dispute. The United States claimed it as
never a part of France, but the claim was not preemptory, but was
made the subject of negotiation with Texas, and of decision by a joint
No decision by the
commission appointed to view the boundary.
commission had ever been made and the United States invoked the
decision of the Supreme Court, by a bill filed in that court in i 89o, in
pursuance of an act of congress providing for it. Texas demurred to
the bill, alleging want of jurisdiction in the court. The court held
that the question was not so far political that it could not decide it,
distinguishing between the determination of international boundaries,
after a decision by the political departments of the government and
the decision of boundaries between state, where there could have been
no decision by the United States, and of boundaries between a state and
territory, when the congress of the United States, far from deciding for
itself, submitted the question to the arbitrament of the court.'
In United States v. Holiday, 2 the defendant was indicted for
selling liquor to Indians under the charge of an Indian superintendent or agent, within a county of the state of Michigan. The secretary of the interior and the commissioner of Indian affairs had decided that, in order to carry the provisions of a treaty with Indian
tribes into effect, the tribal organization should be preserved. The
Supreme Court lay down the rule, that it will follow the action of the
executive and the other political department of the government, in
recognizing certain Indians as forming a tribe (the Chippewas.) And,
if they are a tribe, they are placed by the constitution under the control of congress, which can legislate against a sale of liquor to a subject of such tribe, though the sale be made beyond the reservation, and
within the limits of a state.
The power to make treaties reposes in the president and the senate,
but when made, they become a portion of the law of the land. Nevertheless, like other laws, they are repealable by fresh laws, either in the
form of new treaties, or in the form of statutes in whose making the
I United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621. The case cites the decisions on
inter-state boundaries. In Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 130, the question was
presented whether the retrocession to Virginia by the United States by the
Act of 1846, of Alexander county, a part of the District of Columbia, was constitutional.

The plaintiff had been compelled to pay taxes imposed in Vir-

ginia. The court held Virginia a de-facto government, at least, and declined
to consider the legality of the retrocession.
2 70 U. S. 407. Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1.

THE FORUM
foreign party to the treaty has no voice. In Whitney v. Robertson'
a treaty with San Domingo, respecting the admission into the United
States of importations from that island was invoked, in order to show
an exemption froi the operation of a subsequently enacted tariff law.
The court, holding that this subsequent statute repealed pro tanio the
treaty, remarked that whether such a repeal was just or proper,
was not a judicial question, "that the power to determine these matters has not been confided to the judiciary, which has no suitable
means to exercise it, but to the executive and legislative departments
of our government ; and that they belong to diplomacy and legislation
The question here was
and not to the administration of the laws."
simply whether the power of the United States over a subject regulated
by treaty is ipsofacto extinguished and transferred to the two parties to
the treaty. The decision is that it remains with the United States, and
with its political departments. And even though the United States acquires jurisdiction over certain territory by a treaty of cession, it may
repeal by inconsistent legislation, so much of this treaty as it chooses,
without effecting a surrender of jurisdiction over that territory to the
nation from whom it was obtained. By the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, of February 2d, 1848, Mexico ceded to the United States a
large country of which California is a part. This treaty stipulated for
the recognition by the United States, of titles to lands in the ceded
country, derived through Spanish or Mexican grant. In 1851, congress passed an act appointing a commission and requiring all claimants of land under Spanish or Mexican grants to present their titles to
this commission, and declaring that land for which no claim should
have been presented to the commission within two years, should be
deemed a part of the public domain of the United States. The plaintiff claimed land under Mexican grant, but had not presented his claim
within two years or later to the commission. It was held, that even
if the legislation of 185I violated the treaty, it was binding on the
court. 2
When a right of capture depends on the belligerent status of the
captor, the courts of the United States follow the decision of the
political department of the government with respect to this status.
Thus, the government having recognized the existence of a civil war
between Spain and her South America colonies, the federal courts regarded as lawful the capture of a Spanish vessel by a privateer of Rio
de La Plata. 3
1124 U. S. 190. A similar principle was recognized by the Circuit Court
in the Clinton Bridge, 77 U. S., 454. The treaty with France, which secured
the free navigation of the Mississippi, did not make it impossible for congress
to authorize the construction of a bridge over the river which might interfere
with such navigation.
Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238.
3 The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. 52. The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad,
2

4 Wheat. 497.
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The decision of the treaty-making power, that the other party to a
treaty of cession has annulled a prior grant of land embraced within
the ceded territory, is binding on the courts. Prior to the ratification
of the treaty with Spain for the cession of Florida, the King of Spain
had made large grants of land to the Duke of Alagon. The United
States refused to ratify the treaty without a stipulation that these
grants were annulled. The stipulation was made and the treaty then
rotified. In an ejectment by one claiming under the Duke of Alagon,
it was contended that the cortes only, and not the King of Spain, had,
under the Spanish constitution, power to annul grants made by him.
Taney, C. J., however, held that it was for the president and senate to
determine whether the king could make the stipulation and ratify a
treaty containing it, and that they had affirmed this power, by ratifying
the treaty. The court therefore refused to sanction any title to the
tract, not derived from the United States. I
When the criminal jurisdiction of the United States over the place
of commission of a crime, depends on the validity of a state's retrocession of the place to the United States, and the validity of this retrocession depends on the necessity of the use of the place, for a military
reservation, or for an arsenal, dockyard, etc., the courts follow the decision of the other departments of the government as to this necessity.
In Benson v. United States, 2 Benson was indicted in the Circuit Court
of the United States for murder committed at the Fort Leavenworth
Military Reservation.
The reservation had been retroceded by the
state of Kansas, in 1875. It embraced farming land, not actually employed for military purposes, and the murder was committed on this
farm land. " But, " says Brewer, J., " in matters of that kind, the
courts follow the action of the political department of the government.
The entire tract had been legally reserved for military purposes. *
* * The character and purposes of its occupation having been
officially and legally established by that branch of the government
which has control over such matters, it is not open to the courts, on a
question of jurisdiction, to inquire what may be the actual uses to
which any portion of the reserve is temporarily put. There was therefore jurisdiction in the circuit court, and the first contention of plaintiff in error must be overruled. "
Congress has the power to "provide for calling forth the militia,
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions. "3 Under this power, congress has authorized the president
to call forth the militia, when the. country is invaded, or in imminent
danger of invasion. Martin having been fined for disobeying the order
of the president to repair to rendezvous, during the war of 1812, began
I Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635.
2 146 U. S. 325.
3 Art. I, paragraph 8, cl. 15.
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a replevin to recover the goods seized in satisfaction of the fine. The
Supreme Court held that congress had the power to commit to the
president the judgment whether there was danger of invasion, and
whether the calling forth of the militia was necessary, and that the decision of the president was "concluive upon all other persons. "
"Wherever, " says Story, J., "a statute gives a discretionary power
to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain
facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute constitutes him
the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of these facts. "I
When rights are to be determined by the existence, or non-existence at a given time, of a state of war between the United States and a
domestic or foreign belligerent, the decision of the political department
will be accepted by the courts. The Act of March 2, 1867, declared
that the pay of privates and non-commissioned officers should continue
for three years from the close of the rebellion, as announced by the
proclamation of the president. The president had on Aug. 2oth, 1866,
proclaimed that the rebellion had been wholly suppressed. In an
action brought to recover the value of property taken by the United
States, which action could by law be brought within two years from
the termination of the rebellion, it was held that Aug. 2oth, 1866, must
be considered by the court, as the date of the close of the rebellion,
2
since this date had received presidential and legislative recognition.
The constitution provides3 that the United States shall protect
each state in the Union, "on application of the legislature, or of the
executive when the legislature cannot be convened, against domestic
violence. " In Luther v. Borden, 4 it is laid down by the court that it
is for congress to determine upon the proper means to be adopted to
fulfill this duty. Congress might have placed it in the power of a court
to decide where the contingency requiring Federal intervention, had
happened, but it has in fact given the right to judge to the president,
authorizing him, " in case of an insurrection in any state ", on the application of the legislature or of the executive, to "call forth such
number of the militia of any other state or states, as may be applied
for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection. " In
1842, a constitution was enacted, without previous anthority from the
legislature of the state of Rhode Island, by probably a majority of the
adult males of the state, and possibly by a majority of the adult males
having the right of suffrage under the former state laws. Under this
The former
constitution a governor and a legislature were elected.
and
ordained
of
the
new,
the
legality
governor and legislature denied
martial law. They applied to the president of the United States for
1 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 20.
2 United States v. Anderson, 76 U. S. 56.
3 Art. IV. Sect. 4.
4 7 Howard 1.
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aid. The president signified his intention to call out the militia in
their aid. It was held, in a litigation involving the question which of
the two governments was the lawful one, that the decision of the president was binding. " For certainly, " says Taney, C. J., "no court of
the United States, with a knowledge of this decision, would have been
justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful government,
or in treating as wrong-doers or insurgents the officers of the government which the president had recognized and was prepared to support
by an armed force. I'I

No fault can be found with many of the foregoing decisions.
The self-denying attitude of the court is sensible. It does well to recollect that there are other branches of the government, each with a
sphere of independent discretion and activity, into which the intrusion
of the court, on its own persuasion of superior wisdom or more conscientious reverence for constitutional limitation would be an impertinence. We are now to consider cases in which it is not so easy to
justify the refusal of the court to control the other departments. There
are cases which hold that an executive officer, even a member of the
cabinet, may be controlled by the courts, if the act in question is ministerial and not discretionary, that is, if the law fully identifies the act to
be done, so that there is no legal discretion in the officer, whether to
do it or not, e. g. the delivery of a commission 2 ; or of a patent for
land3 which there is no right to retain; the crediting of one who had
accounts with the United States, as carrier of its mails, with a
certain sum awarded to him by the solicitor of the treasury 4 ; the preparation by the commissioner of patents, after he has determined that the
patent shall issue, of the patent, for the signature of the Secretary of
the Interior, 5 and even ajudge may be compelled to do a non-discretionary act, e. g. the making up of the record and entry of judgment
G
therein, in order that the party may be able to sue out a writ of error.
In such cases the court, deciding that it was the duty of the defendant
to do a specific act, has commanded him to do it by mandamus.
Again the secretary of the interior being about to do a specific act,
I Luther v. Borden, supra. The court holds also that the question which
was the lawful government of the state, was a state question; that the state
courts had decided, and the Federal court should adopt their decision. But,
the state courts had in turn held themselves bound by the decision of the
charter governor and legislature, and Taney, C. J., declares his inability to
see how, being members of a government emanating from the charter, they
could do otherwise. The impossibility of inquiring independently into the
numbers and qualifications of those who voted for the Dorr constitution, is
also adverted to.
2 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137.
3 United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 376.
45 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524.
Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50.
6Ex-parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634. Harrington v. Holler, 111 U. S. 796.
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which he has no right to do, may be prevented from doing it by injunction. 1
There is in principle no difference, as respects the subordination
of an executive officer to the judge, between the judge's commanding
him to do an act which the law requires him to do and forbidding
him to do an act which the law forbids his doing. The act, or the
omission, is, in either case executive, but it is not discretionary. In
state of Mississippi v. Johnson, 2 the attempt was made to restrain
the executive from doing that which, it was alleged, he was under a
legal duty not to do. The Act of March 2d, 1867 for the "more efficient government of the rebel states," and the supplement thereto of
March 23d, 1867, were alleged by Mississippi to be unconstitutional.
Those acts denied the existence of republican government in the lately
rebel states, divided them into military districts, required the placing
of an officer in command in"each district, gave the officer power to suppress and punish all disturbers of the peace and criminals, either
through the local civil tribunals or through military commissions, declared the existing state governments until the re-admission of- these
states to representation in congress, provisional and subject to the
authority of the United States at any time to abolish, or control, and
defined the qualifications of the voters who were to unite in the forming of the new constitutions of the states. The state of Mississippi
asked leave of the Supreme Court to file a bill to restrain the president
from executing these statutes, because of their alleged unconstitutionality. Leave to file was refused and it is interesting to note the
grounds of refusal. These are, (a) the acts to be forbidden are not
merely ministerial but executive, i. e. involve the exercise of discretion.
(b) There are no precedents for the attempt to prevent the execution
by the president of unconstitutional acts. (c) The restraint of the execution of a law, is not distinguishable in principle from the restraint of
the enactment of a law, but it will hardly be contended that the court
can interpose, in any case, to restrain the enactment of an unconstitutional law.
(d) Congress as legislature, and the president as
executive, cannot be restrained by the third department, the judicial,
"through the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance."
(e) The impropriety of judicial interference
with the president, is manifest from the possible consequences. He
cannot be compelled to obey. If he obeys, he exposes himself to impeachment by the house. The court could not restrain the impeachment proceedings.
'Noble v. Union River Logging R. R?. Co., 147 U. S. 165. The company had
filed a map showing the route it desired to take through public lands and this
had been approved by the secretary of the interior. His successor revoked
the approval and directed the commissioner of the land office to cancel the
map. They were enjoined from so doing.
2 71 U. S. 478.
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Let us examine one or two of these grounds.
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The first fails to

note the difference between a discretion as to doing or not doing any
thing, and as to the various modes of doing it, and the absence of any
discretion as to doing it. If the object of the bill was to compel the
president to do this or that, in the execution of the reconstruction acts,
he could well setup that his, not the court's, discretion wjs to decide what
he should do. But the object of the bill was to forbid any action at all,
on the ground that the only authority for action was the Acts of 1867,
and that these acts being unconstitutional, were no authority. If they
were unconstitutional, they were in fact no authority. The president
had no legal discretion as to enforcing them. They were no law, and
his act of alleged enforcement, would be the enforcement of that which
was no law. The only remark the court could make to the suggested
difference between the president's power to select the mode of doing
acts, the selection of which mode was reposed by the constitution
with him, and the president's power to do an act in any mode at all,
when the doing of the act was illegal was, "But we are unable to perceive
that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles,
which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of executive discretion." The courts have, as in the cases surra, undertaken to decide that the law requires a specific act from the executive, and have
not hesitated to command him to do it. Why then can they not decide that the law requires abstinence from a specific act, and command abstinence from it? To allege that the latter interferes with the
discretion constitutionally reposed with the executive, is absurd, for, by
supposition the law is unconstitutional. The object of the bill is
simply to procure a decision, by the department which has successfully
usurped the jurisdiction to sit in judgment on legislative acts, that the
law is unconstitutional, and only when it is decided unconstitutional,
that is, only when the president has no right to execute it, to restrain
the execution of it.
When a statute is declared unconstitutional by the court, it is the
practice of the executive department to refrain from attempts to
execute it for the fu ture. Is that department, in so refraining, acting
according to its duty or not? It is generally conceded that the president properly accepts the decision of the court, that is, that he properly
concedes that the court's judgment, not his own, is the norm of his
official duty. This being so, whether the court shall command him to
accept its decision, or not, is a question of etiquette and, ritual; of
tenderness for the title and dignity of the -executive, and of prudence
on the part of the court, and not a question of trenching on his legal
discretion.
Another ground of the decision was, that, to restrain execution of
statutes, is as bold a measure as to forbid congress to pass the statute.
It is singular that after assuming the right to dnnul statutes at

202

TI

FORUM

some stage of their execution, courts should hesitate about preventing
the enactment of them, as if such prohibition would be an enormity.
In New Orleans Water Works Co. v. City of New Orleans, 1 the
councils of New Orleans had passed several ordinances, conferring the
right to obtain a water supply in contravention of the plaintiff's
monopoly. These ordinances had been declared void because a violaThe councils were nevertheless
tion of the obligation of a contract.
about to pass others open to the same objection, and the plaintiff filed a
bill making the city of New Orleans defendant, and asking that it, its
council, officers, agents, be restrained from granting to persons licenses to take water from the Mississippi in violation of the plaintiff's
rights. The bill was dismissed, the court saying that courts may not
control the discretion of legislative bodies, but that, if an invalid ordinance is passed, the courts will protect private rights that would be
violated by its enforcement. The councils of the city have no legal right
to pass the ordinance, because it is unconstitutional, but the courts
will not interfere at this stage, to declare the voidness of the act; but
will wait until at some later period, an attempt is made to carry it into
execution.
In Mississippi v. Johnson, the complainant waited until the act was
passed, and then asked that its enforcement might be prevented. It
was then told that to ask the court to prevent the execution was as bad
as to ask it to prevent the enactment. The personage who was to be
restrained was the president. He might disobey. Then would the
court compel him? Would it arrest him for contempt? Perhaps he
would not obey. Then "it is needless to observe, that the court is
Powerlessness of the court
without power to enforce its process."
If the president
is a substantial reason for declining jurisdiction.
should obey, he might be impeached, and could the court protect him?
Would it enjoin the proceedings or restore him to his office, if deposed
by the judgment of the senate? Besides, might the court not itself be
impeached for preventing the president from executing the will of congress? And would the court protect its members from deposal by the
arm of injunction? It is evident then, that one important ground of the
decision was the danger that in a direct encounter with the head of the
executive department or with the congress, the court might be worsted.
Against the enactment of a law designed to strip a whole people, as
they think, of fundamental right, and against the initiation of its execution by the president, the courts are of no value on account of their
prudent timidity, or of their actual powerlessness. They are not sure
that submissiveness to the court on the part of the great officers of the
government, has been sufficiently developed to justify taking the risk
of issuing a direct mandate to them.
1164 U. S. 471.
338, 348.

For a contrary view see Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa.
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Let us see then, whether the court will help us at some later stage
of the execution of the law, by injunction. In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, I Georgia extended its jurisdiction over the territory of the
Cherokee nation, and over the Cherokees themselves. The Nation
filed a bill for an injunction against the state of Georgia, the governor,
attorney general, judicial officers, sheriffs, etc., to restrain them from
enforcing the laws of Georgia within the Cherokee territory. The
Squpreme Court refused the inj unction for two reasons, the first of which
was that the Cherokees are not a state, nor a foreign state, and a controversy between it and Georgia is not one between a state and a foreign
state. The federal courts therefore have no jurisdiction. The other
reason is thus expressed by Marshall, C. J. "The bill requires us to
control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its
physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court
may be well questioned; it savors too much of the exercise of political
power, to be within the proper province of the judicial department.
But the opinion on the point respecting parties makes it unnecessary to
decide this question." Precisely what was meant by "savoring" of
the exercise of political power is difficult to know. The thing asked
was an injunction, which is a prohibition. The thing to be enjoyed
was political action. Does the fact that the thing forbidden is political
action, turn the injunction from a non-political to a political process?
acts by political
Surely the cases are not infrequent in which political
2
agents are commanded or forbidden by the courts.
Mr. Justice Thompson is somewhat more explicit, and he seems to
hold that a court of equity does not protect anything else than rights of
property and person, and does not protect the political rights of the person. But it is evident that rights of property and person would be affected by the substitution of the Georgia government for the Cherokee
government, and that, of protecting these rights, (e. g. against Georgia
taxation, against Georgia statutory restraints and regulations of use ;
against Georgia criminal statutes, etc.,) the protection of so called
political rights, is only a more direct method; anticipatory, rather than
1 5 Pet. 1. In Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, the state having by a
constitution and law diverted the proceeds of the taxes from the payment of

debts to which by a binding contract they had been devoted, it was held that

the Circuit Court of the United States could not by mandamus, directed to
the state officers, compel them to appropriate the state's funds according to
the contract.
2 In McPherson v. Blacher, 146 U. S. 1, Michigan had divided itself into
two districts and allotted to each the election of one presidential elector.
Certain candidates for the office of presidential elector, applied for a mandamus to the state officers, to do certain acts preparing for a vote by the whole

state as a unit for electors. The Supreme Court of the United States on error,
decided to entertain jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the state officers might

disregard its decision.

The constitutionality of the act was a judicial ques-

tion, and the court could not be induced to refuse jurisdiction, "upon the in-

admissible suggestion that actions might be taken by political agencies, in
disregard of the judgment of the highest tribunal of the state as revised by
our own."
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remedial. The difference is simply between forbidding the making or
enforcing of a law which, if passed or enforced, will violate the right
of person or property, and at some later stage of enforcement, forbidding the further enforcement, or after complete enforcement, indemnifying by action of tort. An example of the difference is furnished by
In pursuance of the policy complained of in
Worcester v. Georgia.'
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, that state enacted, two years afterwards, a
law punishing all white persons who remained in the Cherokee country
without license from the governor of Georgia. Worcester, a Vermonter, and missionary among these Indians, was arrested, tried and
convicted of violating this statute. On a writ of error the Supreme
Court held that the regulation of intercourse with the Indians was not
with Georgia but with the United States, that the Georgia law was void,
and the conviction invalid. It awarded judgment that Worcester be
dismissed without day, and that a special mandate issue to the Georgia
court, to carry this judgment into execution. Worcester's right to be
in the Cherokee country depended on the respective political rights of
the Cherokee Nation and of Georgia. Indeed his own right was, if it
existed, political, viz., the right to be in the Cherokee Nation without the
license of the governor of Georgia. In imprisoning him, no wrong was
done him, except so far as a political right, derivative from that of the
Cherokee Nation, was denied by the Georgia statute. The courts therefore do not refrain from vindicating political rights. The only question
is which of them they will vindicate, and which not, and in what
modes they will vindicate. What Cherokee Nation v. Georgia teaches
is, probably, that the political right of a community will not be vindicated at the suit of that community, and that the political right either
of community or individual, will not be vindicated, in a suit against so
imposing a body as a state. The court's powerlessness in the face of a
strong and possibly insubordinate defendant seems to be the principal
reason for accepting the latter of these principles.
In the State of Georgia v. Stanton,2 the State of Georgia filed a
bill complaining of the attempt to execute the statute of 1867, of which
in Mississippi v. Johnson, Mississippi complained. Respecting the
dignity of the president, Georgia's bill was directed not against him
but against Stanton, Secretary of War, Grant, General of the army,
and Pope, Major-General in command of the Third Military District,
of which Georgia was a part. It prayed for an injunction restraining
the defendants from carrying into execution the provisions of the Reconstruction Acts. This plaintiff also was unsuccessful. The ground
now alleged by the court is that the matters involved "are political
and not judicial." The rights sought to be vindicated are the political
1 6 Peters 51S.
2 73 U. S. 50.
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rights of Georgia, and that injunction is granted by equity courts to

protect rights of person or property only. To this effort to confine the
equitable jurisdiction of the court, the reply was made in argument,
that the court had frequently entertained bills to determine the bound aries between states. This was parried by the suggestion that a
boundary question was, of itself, not a political question, and that

sovereignty and jurisdiction were but incidental. Of course the fixing
of the boundary would be accomplished by processes of investigation
and reasoning in familiar use by the courts, but the boundary was to be
fixed, not in order that a moot question might be interestingly decided,
but in order that one political community should withdraw, and
another extend, its jurisdiction over territory between the existing and
the newly fixed boundaries. The object would be political.
But, the only question in the case before the court that differs from
the question before it in any case turning on the constitutionality of an
act of congress, is the character of the act which the court is asked to
do, after determining that question. Whether the Reconstruction
Acts are constitutional is the same sort of question, as whether the act
conferring original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in habeas corpus,
was constitutional. 1 It was necessary, in both cases, to compare the
statute with the constitution. But in one case, the effect of the decision was to mdke it necessary for the court, if the act was constitutional, to issue a mandamus to the secretary of state to deliver a commission; if the act was unconstitutional, to refrain from issuing the
mandamus; while in the present one, the solicited effect of deciding
the act unconstitutional was an injunction against doing anything
towards its enforcement, directed to rather eminent personages. Oblivious entirely of the grounds alleged in Mississippi v.Johnson, the court
finds sijnply that the rights to be defended; are political rights of a
community, the state, not personal or property rights of individuals.
Should the Reconstruction Acts go into operation, despite their
unconstitutionality, the result would be that the defences of property
and personal security may be withdrawn for years. The edicts of the
military power will be ultimately declared void. Judgments of military commissions, whether civil or criminal, will be nullities, but meantime the laws of the state which protect person and property, and the
state machinery for making these laws truly protective, will have been
suspended. With the rights of property are inseparably implicated the
so-called political rights, and to refuse to defend these is to refuse effectually to defend those. We may suspect that the prudence which
revealed itself in Mississippi v. Johnson had not, though shrewdly
veiled, disappeared in Georgia v. Stanton. What an immense service
to the South and to the whole country might have been rendered, had
1

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137.
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the Supreme Court courageously decided, when it had the chance,
whether the Reconstruction Acts were constitutional.
In McArdle's case we find the Reconstruction Acts in a later stage
of execution. A citizen has been arrested, and is about to be tried by
a court of soldiers for crimes defined to be such by the will of the commanding officer, or by act of congress of questioned constitutionality.
He applies for a hdbeas corfius. Would the court have dared to do
against the Major- General commanding, what it had hesitated to do,
in Georgia v. Stanton ? There, it was asked to arrest in tolo, the execution of the law; here it was asked to arrest one of many thousands of acts, in execution of it. The court was relieved of the duty, at
the critical moment, as we have seen, by the repeal of the act conferring appellate jurisdiction and the ChiefJustice was able resignedly to
dismiss the case by the remark "judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction, than in exercising firmly that
which the constitution and the laws confer."
The Supreme Court has assumed to itself.the function ofsitting in
judgment on the constitutionality of acts of congress. It is to be regretted that it should have adopted principles for its guidance in administering this imposing power, which render it of far less utility to
the people than it might be. Instead of launching preventive process
against insignificant officers only, or subjecting inferior agents only to
actions of indemnification, a method which allows an unconstitutional
law to be executed for many years, and upon many hundreds or thousands of citizens, before a decision in some c.omparatively obscure case
is reached, it would be better to obtain a judgment of the court, if not
in a proceeding to prevent the enactment, at least in a proceeding
against the chief excutive officers, who, in a sense, control the executhroughout the country. The Reconstruction Acts oppressed
tion of it,
the former seceded states for many years. The turmoil, excitement
and peril of a decade might have been avoided, had the court welcomed the opportunity furnished by Mississippi v. Johnson, or by
Georgia v. Stanton, and pronounced its judgment as to the constitutionality of the law. The course actually pursued, was doubtless more
prudent from the point of view of the peace of mind and safety of the
judges, but how costly to the nation.
Without injustice to the court, it can, we think, be affirmed, that
by its unwillingness to take the risks attendant on a prohibition of unconstitutional legislative action, or on an early prevention of executive
steps looking to the enforcement of unconstitutional laws, the court
has very much curtailed its utility as a guardian of fundamental rights.
And it has also been illogical. The most inferior executive officer, a
sheriff or constable, or marshall, a tax-assessor or collector, in performing what he thinks his duty is acting out his own judgment, or the
judgment of some superior officer. It ought to matter not, how high
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or low in the official hierarchy such officer may be. If his only
authority is an unconstitutional law, he is altogether without authority,
and the court should be as ready to forbid the highest as the lowest
executive officer, from doing acts for which only an unconstitutional
statute can be vouched. It is no solace to-the aggrieved person, that
his oppressor is a dignified and highly salaried servant of the state.
And there is no greater right in a high functionary, member of the
cabinet, general of the army, or even president of the United States,
to do acts against the interests of citizens on the warrant of unconstitutional statutes, than in the humblest officer. As to the suggestion
that the president might disobey the court, the answer of Justice Davis,
in ex parte Milligan,I where it was suggested that possibly the president had carried out by hanging, the sentence of a military court, despite an appeal to the Federal Courts, is pertinent. "But even the
suggestion is injurious to the executive, and we dismiss it from
further consideration." The right of the court to determine the constitutionality of statutes being universally conceded, it is not to be
presumed that president or congress would resent any decision by that
court, in a case brought before it, whether the party were the president,
or his subordinate, of whatever rank.
'71 U. S. 2.

MOOT COURT
JONES v. McPHERSON.
Sheriffs interpleader-Sales-Conditional
upon payment of price.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court.
Dobin for the plaintiff.
This was a conditional sale and Enos McPherson took no better title to
the property than his brother had. There was also fraud between the brothers
and the contract is therefore voidable. 8 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 791,-802,-5.
Where a sale has been induced through fraud, the vendor may rescind by
restoring the vendee to his position before the making of the contract.
Sloane v. Shiffer, 156 Pa. 59.
Gardnerfor the defendant.
Title passed by delivery and the vendor cannot rescind save if actual
fraud be indubitably shown. Insolvency of vendee and his knowedge of it
are not fraudulent. Smith v. Smith, 21 Pa. 367.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

MoALEE, J.:-Jones, a tobacco merchant from New York, sold to Isaac

McPherson a quantity of Sumatra tobacco. The tobacco reached its destination on the 20th of September, 1904. On the 19th of September, 1904, execu:
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tion had been issued by his brother, Enos McPherson, on a judgment note.
On the 20th the sheriff levied on Isaac McPherson's goods, and on the same
day Isaac sent his men to take charge of the tobacco and he had it listed on
the sheriff's notice. One of the conditions of the sale was that $218.20 out of
$377.30 should be paid in cash, the remainder, $159.20, by a note at four
mouths. Instead of sending the cash McPherson sent his check for $218 20
and his note for the remainder. Jones refused to take the check and demands
the goods. The sheriff therefore brings this action to determine the ownership
to the tobacco taken in execution.
The plaintiff, Jones, relies on two grounds to recover the tobacco. First,
that there was fraud practiced on him to secure the goods and therefore he
could rescind the sale. Second, the sale was a conditional one and the payment of cash was a condition precedent and that by the failure of McPherson
to send the cash, the ownership did not pass to McPherson but remained in
Jones.
McPherson, when he ordered the goods from Jones' agent, knew that he
was in debt and possibly would not be able to pay for them. And when the
tobacco arrived and he sent one of his workmen to take it from the warehouse
he knew he would be unable to pay for it as he instantly listed it on the
sheriff's notice.
It clearly appears that McPherson wished to make the fund as large as
possible from which his brother, the execution creditor, was to be paid. His
intention not to pay and his subsequent acts were decidedly dishonest, but
cannot be called such fraud as would set the sale aside. The law seems to be
well settled in this state that insolvency and the mere knowledge of it is not
such fraud as to set aside a sale and enable the vendor to rescind. It requires
artifice, false pretense or trickery as a means of obtaining possession, to avoid
the sale. There must be bad faith-an intent at the time to defraud the seller.
Insolvency and a knowledge of it at the time are evidence to go to the jury
with other facts to show the intended fraud, but standing alone will not operate to rescind after possession fully and fairly obtained. Rodman v. Thalhman,
75 Pa. 252.
In this case there was no artifice, false pretense or trickery
either at the time of the making of the contract or at the time of the
taking of possession. Only the fact of the insolvency was suppressed, and
consequently we do not think that Jones could rescind on the ground of
fraud.
It was expressly stipulated in the terms of the contract thai $218..20 of the
$377.30 was to be paid in cash and the remainder, $159.20, by a note for four
months. The question therefore is, was the failure on the part of McPherson
to send the cash sufficient to make the apparent delivery to him operate so
as to allow Jones still to be the owner. In Wolsey v. Axtbn, 192 Pa. 526, C
agreed to deliver to A, a raft of logs at G, payment to be $100 at the time of
signing the agreement, one half in cash and remainder in notes to be paid the
following April lst. The $100 was paid and C brought the raft to the place of
delivery. When the settlement was made or rather attempted, A claimed
that C -owed him an old debt of $500 for which he claimed credit on account
of the price of the raft. C denied this claim, and demanded payment according to the contract. A refused. C sold the raft. to B. A sued B for the price of
the logs. The court held that there had been no delivery; that the intention of
the parties was clear that payment according to the terms of the contract and
not by an old claim, not mentioned in the said contract was a condition precedent to the legal delivery to A, and he therefore never acquired title to the
logs.
A sale for cash implies that the delivery and the payment are to be con-
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current acts and if the goods are handed over on the expectation that the cash
will be concurrently paid, a failure so to pay is a breach of the condition
which deprives the delivery of its effect and the title does not pass.
In this case we think that the stipulation as to the payment of a part in
cash was regarded as a condition precedent, and the fact that McPherson
-sent a check instead of the cash was such a breach of condition as to deprive
the delivery of its effect. And the title still remained in Jones.
We therefore think that Jones, the plaintiff in this suit, is entitled to the
goods in the hands of the sheriff on the ground that McPherson never owned
them.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Of the price of the tobacco, $218.20 were to be paid in cash on delivery,
and a note at four months was to be delivered for $159.20. The tobacco arrived
and possession of it was had by McPherson on Sept. 20th, 1904. Instead of
then paying $218.20 in cash, he transmitted a check and the note. If there
had been money in the bank awaiting this check, perhaps it could be treated
as the equivalent of the cash. There was only $10 in bank.
The delivery had been made with the intention that title should pass only
on the condition that the cash and note- should be delivered simultaneously.
This condition being unfulfilled, the goods could be reclaimed. Windle v.
Moore, 1 Chest. 409; Logan v. Smith, 14 Phila. 114; 8 W. N. C. 103; Logan's
Appeal, 3 Walk. 203; Nat. Refining Co. v. Miller, 7 Phila. 97; Henderson v.
Lauck, 21 Pa. 359; Miller v. Munhall, 34 L. I. 321; Kitchen v. Stokes, 9 W.
N. C. 48.
This condition is enforceable against execution creditors of the vendee,
even when the execution arises after the delivery of the goods, afortioriwhen
it precedes the delivery.
It follows that in the sherifPs interpleader, the juolgment was properly
entered for the vendor.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. ETTINGER.
Crimes-Constitutionallaw-Act 316y 9, 1889, P. L. 145-Power of state to
punish officers of -NationalBanks.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Ettinger, cashier of National Bank of Harrisburg, was convicted under a
statute of Pennsylvania, making any officer of any bank, criminally liable for
receiving any deposit while having knowledge of the bank's insolvency.
This is an appeal on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional.
Act of May 9, 1889, P. L. 145;P. &L. Dig., vol. 1, col. 297: "Any banker,
broker or officer of any trust or savings institution, national, state or private
bank, who shall take and receive money from a depositor with the knowledge
that he, they or the bank is at the time insolvent, shall be guilty of embezzlement, and shall be punished by a fine in double the amount so received, and
imprisoned from one to three years in the penitentiary."
Davis for the Commonwealth.
Showalter for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

REESER, J. :-The legislation making the receiving of deposits, by a bank
officer, knowing the bank to be insolvent, criminal, seems to be of recent origin. But it seems to be extending into new jurisdictions with some rapidity.
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The court in Baker v. State, 54 Wis. 368, mentions as the states which have
adopted statutes for the punishment of bankers who receive deposits when insolvent the following: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, California, Missouri,
South Carolina, Michigan and New York and to these may be added Alabama
and Colorado.
The offense described in the Act of May 9,1889, is embezzlement, which is
the "fraudulent appropriation of the goods of another by a person entrusted
with the property of the same. " I Whar. Crim. Law, 1009. The appropriation forbidden is the appropriation by a banker, broker, or officer of a banking
institution of money received from a depositor at a time when the person, or
in the case of an officer, the institution, so receiving the same is insolvent,
and has knowledge of such insolvency.
Embezzlement is a legal term with a clearly defined and well understood
meaning. The use of this word in defining the offense clearly indicates the
legislative intent and shows that the criminal act contemplated was the unlawful conversion of the money deposited.
"The legislature could not have intended to make the mere act of receiving deposits embezzlement; for the depositor may have been paid promptly on
demand, or the deposit may ba'e been made with a knowledge on the part of the
depositor of the insolvency of the defendant, or it may have been made by one
who was at the time indebted to the bank in a greater amount than the sum
deposited ;" per Henderson, J., in Coin. v. Delamater, et. al., 2 Pa. Dist. Rep.
119. But the court in Coin. v. Sponsler and Junkin, 170 Pa. 194, held "Its
aim is to punish dishonesty; the moral guilt which prompts to falsehood and
deception; for there is necessarily moral guilt on the part of a banker who
with knowledge of insolvency, receives as a bank deposit the money of a customer. By necessary implication, when he so receives it he says to the depositor: "My bank is solvent, and is able to repay this amount when called
for."
If such were not the implied representation, relied on by the depositor,
he would not leave his money.
The court also said to constitute the criminal intent it is not necessary
that the banker at the time intended to defraud the depositor. "His intention to repay may have existed. It is the concealment of his present, to him
known, inability to pay, and in that condition receiving, as part of the funds
of the bank the depositor's money, which he knows, without false representation, he would not receive, that constitutes the criminal intent. ,"
The statutes have been attacked as unconstitutional in several instances.
In Alabama the attack was successful. Carr v. State, 106 Ala. 35; 34 L. R. A.
643. But in other states having somewhat different statutes the attacks have
failed. Robertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279. In Com. v. Smith, 11 Lan. L. Rev.
350, the Pennsylvania Act of May 9, 1889, was attacked as unconstitutional, but
the court without directly passing upon the question upheld the indictment,
thereby implying the statute was constitutional. The indictment was also
sustained in Commonwealth v. Rockafellow, 163 Pa. 139. So also in Com. v.
Sponsler, 16 Pa. C. C. R. 116, thecourt held the act to be constitutional and not
in violation of Art I., 16, of the Constitution. The constitutionality of the
act was also raised in the Supreme Court, but court sent the case back for a
new trial because of error in charge to the jury. (vide 170 Pa. 194.)
In Robertson v. People, 20 Colo. 279, the defendant contended the Colorado
Act "to provide for the punishment of a person receiving deposits in, or creating indebtedness, by any bank or banking institution with knowledge of the
insolvency of such bank or banking institution," was.unconstitutional, as beIng in violation of 12 of Bill of Rights of Constitution of the State of Colorado,
which provides, "no person shall be imprisoned for debt unless . . . when
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there is a strong presumption of fraud," and further, thatsuch statute violated
25 of Bill of Rights, which reads that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law," and also that such statute was
in violation of Article XIV of Amendments of Constitution of United States.
The court held, however, that the imprisonment under such act, was not an
imprisonment for debt but for a crime, and therefore the constitutional provisions regarding imprisonment for debt did notapply. Mleadowcroft v. People,
163 Ill. 56; Baker v. State, supra.
Ettinger, the defendant, was a cashier of a National Bank. Can the act
constitutionally apply to National Bank officers ? Is the statute an attempt
to control and regulate the businessoperations of a National Bank? We think
the argument of counsel that the act in question is an attempt to regulate the
business of the bank, is not a proper construction of the law. This statute is
in the nature of a police regulation, having for its object the protection of the
The exercise of the police
public from the fraudulent acts of bank officers.
power of the State has never been doubted but the difficulty arises from its application and the limitation of its boundaries. The manifest object of the
statute in question was to suppress the business of banking by an insolvent person, company, or corporation. It therefore inflicts punishment upon persons
so engaged having knowledge of the fact. The bank is intrusted with the
money because it is supposed to have surplus capital as a standing guarantee
of its agreements and its integrity. For an insolvent banker, company, or
corporation to continue the business of banking is to hold 'out assurance of responsibilities and surplus capital when neither exist, and to do so knowingly
is to secure the confidence, and hence obtain the money of the ignorant and
unguarded by an implied deception. To suppress this mischief and to save
the public from being induced to deposit money with such insolvent banks,
holding out the implied assurance of responsibility and wealth essential to the
banking business, when they do not in fact exist, was the evident purpose of
the act. But does this statute interfere with the Acts of Congress regulating
National Banks?
The National Banking Act, 5209, Rev. Stat., provides for three distinct
offences: First, embezzlement; second, abstraction; third, willful misappli.
cation of the moneys, funds, or credits of the bank by any president, director,
cashier, teller, clerk or agent of any association organized as a National banking
association.
Embezzlement as defined by National Banking Act, is the unlawful conversion by an officer of the bank to his own use of funds intrusted to him,
with intent to injure or defraud the bank. U. S. v. Youtsey, 91 Fed. Rep.
867; 21 American and English Ency. 361, note 13.
And it has been held that embezzlement of money of a depositor, simply
deposited in a national bank, and not belonging to the bank, is not within
the purview of the United States law and is punishable by state courts. 10
American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 1014, and cases therein cited.
In so far as the statutes of the United States cover offenses by national
bank officers they exclude state legislation on the subject. State v. Tuller, 34
Conn. 280; State v. Fields, 98 Iowa 748; Com. v. Felton, 101 lass. 204; Com.
v. Kituer, 92 Pa. 372. But where an act made punishable by a state statute is
not an offence by the laws of the United States, national bank officers are
amenable to the state law. State v. Tuller, 34 Conn. 280; State v. Fields, 98
Iowa 748; Com. v. Barry, 116 Mass. 1; State v. Cross, 101 N. Car. 770, affirmed
in Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 131, and since the federal courts have no
criminal jurisdiction, except that conferred by congress, no question can be
made as to the constitutionality of state legislation punishing such frauds,
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until they have been made punishable by the federal laws. The courts all
agree that the state sovereignty remains unabridged for the punishment of all
crimes committed within its limits, except so far as they have been brought
within the sphere of federal jurisdiction by the penial laws of the United
States.
In the case of National Bank v. Com., 9 Wall 353, the Court said "The
limitation is, that the agencies of the federal government are only exempted
from state legislation so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair
their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed to
serve that government . . . he issubject to all the laws of the state which
affect his family, or social relations, or his property, and he is liable to punishment for crime, though that punishment be imprisonment or death. So of
the banks. They are subject to the laws of the state, and are governed in
their daily course of business far more by laws of the state than of the nation.
. .
It is only when the state law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional."
And it has been held that the Iowa statute making it a criminal offence
for an officer of an insolvent to receive deposits with knowledge that the bank
is insolvent, applies to officers'of national banks. State v. Fields, 98 Iowa
748; State v. Easton (Iowa 1901), 85 N. W. Rep. 795. Holding that it was not
void on ground that it was an attempt to control and regulate the business
operations of national banks and to prescribe a condition upon which deposits
may not be received.
The design of the law seems to be for the public good and in our opinion
is not in violation of any express or implied provisions of the state or national
constitution. The order of the lower court is affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The objection to the conviction of Ettinger is, that the Act of May 9, 1889,
under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional.
The act does not violate the Constitution of Pennsylvania. Commonwealth
v. Rockafellow, 163 Pa. 139. The provision in the 16th section of Art. I, that
a debtor shall not be continued in prison, etc., is irrelevant. Ettinger is not a
debtor. He is not arrested for debt. Commonwealth v. Sponsler, 16 Pa. C. C.
116; (f. 170 Pa. 194.
Does the act violate the Federal Constitution? It is feebly suggested that
it infringes the XIVth Amendment, concerning a State's depriving a person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Penalizing the reception by a bank's officer of the money of a depositor, with knowledge that the
bank is insolvent, is surely not depriving of liberty or property without due
process.
The bank of which Ettinger was cashier was a national bank. The Act of
1889 punishes the reception by an officer of any "f national, state or private
bank" of moneys of a depositor, with knowledge that the bank is insolvent.
A national bank is a national institution. The State cannot embarrass its
operations by penalizing legitimate banking acts. Such a bank comes into
contact with the citizens of the State in which it is established. It receives
their money on deposit: it lends to them. Its notes circulate among them.
The protection of its citizens from fraud is one of the most serious duties of the
State. It can matter little whether the fraud.is committed by an officer or a
corporation of the United States. It cannot be assumed that Congress intended
national banks to have the right to commit such fraud. In the absence of
evidence that it did, the State's power to defend its citizens from imposition by
national banks must be deemed unquestionable.
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It has not been made to appear that the laws of Congress have penalized
the act with which Ettiuger is charged. But, if they had, it would not follow
that the State could not also punish it. The same act may violate both Federal and State law, and be concurrently punishable by Federal and State
authority; e.g., forgery of securities-Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U. S. 140;
the forgery of foreign securities-United States v. Arizona, 120 U. S. 489 ; of
counterfeiting or passing counterfeit coin of the United States-Fox v. Ohio, 5
How. 412. Had Congress prohibited, under penalty, officers of national banks
from receiving deposits when, to their knowledge, the bank was insolvent, it
would have still been competent for-the State to do the same.
That bank officers ought to be allowed to take deposits from unsuspecting
persons, when they know that their bank is insolvent, few would be hardy
enough to affirm. Such act is as morally reprehensible as passing counterfeit
coin or forged instruments. Why should not the people of a State be defended
from it? And, if the United States do not defend them, why should the State
not defend them? Or even if the United States should defend them, why, if
in the judgment of the State its methods of defense are not energetic enough,
the probability of its actually inflicting the punishment not great enough,
should the State not also exert its own penalizing powers to make the protection of its citizens the surer?
If a Federal 0ffi.er, a postmaster, a letter carrier, a deputy collector, commits arson or robbery, the State may punish him, even though the act was
done in the pretended performance of his office. If a national bank or other
Federal corporation should trespass on the land of a citizen of a State, or cause
the publication of a slander, or contract a debt, State tribunals could give redress to the plaintiff. Unless we are prepared to adopt the principle that no
agent of the United States, natural or artificial, acting within a State, can be
restrained from crime, or tort, or breach of contractual duty by State law, there
is no reason for holding that a cashier in a Federal bank may not be prohibited
by State law from defrauding its subiects, and punished if they do.
We are entirely satisfied with the reasoning and conclusions of the learned
court below.
Judgment affirmed.

DAVIS vs. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.
Torts--Negligehce-Concurrentnegligence of crews of vessels-Federal ruleRule in State Courts.

STATEMENT OF TRE CASE.

Davis is the owner of a vessel called "The Orient," which while on her
way to her dock in the city of Philadelphia, collided with a fire-tug belonging
to the city. The captain of "The Orient" wa4 shown to have been slightly
negligent at the time but the management of the fire-tug at the time was confessedly grossly negligent. Both boats were seriously injured as a result of the
collision. This is ajuit to recover for the damage to "The Orient."
Bowman for the plaintiff.
Where the injured vessel has been slightly negligent, and the other grossly
negligent, a recovery is allowed in admiralty courts. Cushing v. Traser, 21
How. 19i; Sturgis v. Boyer, 24How. 124 ; UcCready v. Goldsmith, 18 How. 89;
The Girdler, 7 Wall, 196; The Homer, 99 Fed. Rep. 795.
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Braddock for the defendant.
Any contributory negligence bars the plaintiff's action, as admiralty rule
of concurrent or comparative negligence is not recognized in the State courts.
Campbell v. Williamson, 1 Phila. 198; R. R. Co. v. Norton, 24 Pa. 465.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

MNGES, J. -- Davis seeks to recover damages in an action at common
law. It may here be said that he would have had no standing, whatsoever,
in a court of admiralty, for the reason that such court has nojurisdiction since
the defendant's fire-tug is owned and engaged in the service of a city government.
1 Am.& Eng. Ency. of Law. 654. Counsel for plaintiff lays much stress
upon the case of McCready v. Goldsmith, 18 How. 89. We fail to understand
the case as he sees it. The court says with perfect clearness that Lhe plaintiff
was not slightly negligent. Recovery is therefore allowed.
The management of the fire-tug was grossly negligent. Davis was slightly
negligent. Has the contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributed to the injury? Unless it has, there can be no recovery. This the
jury must decide. The rule is, that if the plaintiff's negligence contributed in
any degree, however slight, to the injury, he cannot recover. Monongahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9; Oil City Supply Company v. Bormly, 122 Pa.
449; Long v. Milford Township, 137 Pa. 122.
Courts are inclined to regard as error any limitation upon the effect of any
degree of contributory negligence of the plaintiff as defeating his right of recovery.
In Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674, in a case of collision, the court held that
in order to maintain his action, the plaintiff was obliged to establish the negligence of the defendant, and that such negligence was the sole cause of the
injury, or, in other words, he could not recover, though defendant were negligent, if it appeared that his own negligence directly contributed to the result
complained of.
"The doctrine in admiralty of an equal division of damages in the case of
a collision between two vessels, when both are in fault contributing to the collision, has long prevailed in England and this country. The Max Morris, 137
U. S. 1. But at common law the general rule is, that if both vessels are culpable in respect of faults operating directly and immediately to produce the
collision, neither can recover damages forinjuries so caused. Atlee v. Packet
Company, 21 Wall. 389." Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674.
"It is an incontestable principle that where the injury complained of is
the product of mutual or concurrent negligence, no action for damages will
lie. The parties being mutually at fault, there can be no apportionment of
damages. The law has no scale to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing
weighed most in the compound that occasioned the mischief." 2 Jag. on
Torts, 979.
The doctrine of comparative negligefce is not recognized in Pennsylvania.
Railroad v. Norton, 24 Pa. 465; Railroad v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186.
Illinois is the only state recognizing this doctrine, and even this state in
its latest decisions no more seems to recognize it. City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163. The question of negligence must be decided by the jury and
judgment will then be entered accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The action is by the owner of the "Orient" against the owner (viz., the
City of Philadelphia) of the fire-tug.
That state courts of law have jurisdiction in cases of collision, of actions in
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personam, is clear. Brown v. Gilmore, 92 Pa. 40; Cf. cases cited 13 P. & L.
Dig. Decisions, colh 21554.
The slight negligence of the captain of the "Orient" contributed to tle
collision, but the officers of the fire-tug were grossly negligent. The question
is whether the admiralty rule that in cases of concurrent negligence, there
shall be an apportionment of the loss between the plaintiff and defendant.
Steamer M[ax Morris v. Curry, 137 U. S. 1, is applied in actions at common
law in the state courts. The answer is distinct. It is not applied. On the
contrary the ordinary rule that a plaintiff whose negligence, however
slight, contributes to the injury is remediless against the defendant, however
gross his negligence, is recognized. The Panther v. The Ajax, 3 Pittsb. 328;
Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311; Campbell v. Williamson, 1 Phila. 198; Rees
v. Walton, 49 Pittsb. L. J. 200; Belden v. Chase, 150 U. S. 674; Atlee v. N.
W. Union Packet Co., 88 U. S. 389.
Judgment affirmed.

BATTLE vs. THE TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
T,.espass-Negligence-istakein tansmission of mcssage-Damages- fental distress.
STATEMENT OF TIHE CASE.

Plaintiff's husband dying, she sent to her relatives in Pittsburg a telegram
announcing the death and desiring them to meet her and the corpse at the
railroad station. The telegram as delivered was signed Mary Beatty, and
the person to whom it was sent not understanding it, paid no attention to it.
When plaintiff arrived at Pittsburg she found no one awaiting her, and being
ill was obliged to take refuge in a hotel for the night, and was alone until the
following morning at 10 o'clock, when her relatives came to her. She sues
the company for $250 for mental distress, and for $20, the expense to which
she was put on account of the mistake.
.Rexach for the plaintiff.
Company liable for errors. Tel. Co. v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 262; Tel. Co. v.
Driburg, 35 Pa. 298. Stipulation against negligence of servants not valid.
Tel. Co. v. Park, 13 Cal. 422. Damages.may be recovered for mental distress
caused by an error in telegraph me.sage. Linn v. Duquesne Bor, 204 Pa. 551.
Jtauffenbart for the defendant.
Telegraph company may stipulate against errors in unrepeated message.
Passmore v. Tel. Co., 78 Pa. 238. Mental anguish alone, unaccompanied by an
injury to the person, is no ground of action. Ewing v. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BRADDOCK, J. :-Action against telegraph company to recover damage for a
mistake committed by its servants in the transmission of a telegraphic message. As to stipulations upon back we will not discuss more than to say that
it has been decided in Passmore v. W. U. Telegraph Co., 78 Pa. 238, that a
stipulation to repeat upon a blank is not contrary to public interest and not
invalid. There are only two systems of wires in Pennsylvania besides the
private wires of the railroad corporations, grain merchants and newspapers.
Therefore, we think there cannot be a recovery. But negligence of defendant
company granted, the damages which may be fairly supposed to enter into
contemplation of parties are such as might naturally be expected to follow
the violation of a contract by the company or its agent; U. S. Tel. Co. v.

216

THE FORUM

Wagner, 55 Pa. 262, i. e., they should be only those which are incidental to,
and directly caused by the breach, and may reasonably be. presumed to have
entered into contemplation of parties not speculative, profits, or accidental or
consequential.
Now, I think it evident as to the first item of $20 for hotel and other expenses, surely these were not in contemplation of parties. How should company know the plaintiff would not send a messenger in preference to staying
over at hotel, and even if message had arrived would she not have to pay
some one for her lodging and boarding? Surely there are cheaper hotels than
those of the $20 rate. This point has been passed upon in Arkansas. W. U.
Tel. Co. v. Short, 9 L. R. A. 744.
As to item of $250 mental distress: In no case has it ever been 'held that
mental anguish alone unaccompanied by an injury to person, afforded a cause
of action. Ewing v. P. C. & St. L. By. Co., 147 Pa. 40; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131
U. S. 22; Stowe v. Haywood, 89 Mass. 118; Linn v. Duquesne Borough, 204
Pa. 551.
Plaintiff cannot recover.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The company was under a duty to transmit the exact'message. That, having failed to do so, it incurred a liability, is indisputable. The name transmitted, Mary Beatty, left the addressee uninformed as to what he was expected to do, with the consequences described in the case.
There is no dispute concerning the liability for the $20, the expense to
which Mrs. Battle was put by the error. She suffered mental distress, and for
this, seeks $250. There has been a singular reluctance in some courts, to allow
damages for "mental distress." Pain has long been a subject of compensation.
Yet it is mental. It has causes probably, in lesions of the nerves, but these
lesions are often known only by the pain. Doubtless what is called "distress"
will some day be shown to have some connection with a state of the brain and
nerves. How can it matter, whether this connection is that of cause, or effect,
or concomitant?
Why should the "pain" incidental to a muscular, osseous, or nervous
lesion be a subject of compensation, and the more refined, but no less real
and important pain known as distress, not be?
The causal nexus between the negligence or other wrong of the defendant
and the distress, may be just as clear aa that between the wrong and the pain.
We may infer from the uniformities in human beings, that a cut or bruise
awakened pain in X, because it has awakened pain in A, orB, or C, when they
suffered a cut or bruise. It is just as certain that a woman situated as was
Mary Battle, would suffer distress, as that one whose leg was crushed, would
suffer pain. Some courts have suggested the difficulty of satisfactorily proving mental pain, as a reason for rejecting it as a basis for compensation. There
may be cases in which its existence, quality and quantity would be hard to
prove. But there are others, in which there would be no serious difficulty.
Why refuse compensation, when there can be no serious doubt of the pain,
because there are cases in which such serious doubt exists? To take up such
an attitude would not uncharitably be branded as imbecile.
The ordinary human being can readily appreciate the emotions of Mrs.
Battle, under the circumstances. A woman, with the corpse of her husband,
arrives at a distant place, with expectation of being met by her relatives,
who would have received and cared for her, and administered comfort to her.
To deny compensation for the distressing state of mind, in deference to a petty
point about difficulty of proof, when in fact there was no difficulty, would be
unworthy of a court.
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It does not follow, from the allowance of compensation for some mental
suffering, that it must be allowed for all. Some may be so ordinarily connected with the event, that no serious doubt of its reality or severity could
exist, upon proof of the event. Others might be distantly and contingently
connected with that event. What we object to is the making of "mental
distress" into a category, and the application to the whole category of the
principle that it shall be incapable of compensation.
That an exception has been made to this principle in the case of failure to
deliver telegrams announcing illness or death, is recognized in Linn v. Duquesne Borough, 204 Pa. 551; though it is hard to realize why for disturbed
emotions caused by that kind of a tort, compensation should be allowed, while
not for those caused by other sorts.
The grounds for excluding compensation for fright, mental pain, etc., are
so variously stated by different jurists, that it is easy to see that there is no
consensus as to reason. Sometimes it is that the mental state is not the
natural and proximate result of the act complained of; sometimes, because
the law "cannot value" mental pain or anxiety, when that is the sole result of the unlawful act. How it could be better "valued," if it was a concomitant result, only deep psychologists can detect.
In Ewing v. P. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40, the doctrine is laid down
that for mere fright, caused by the running into a house of the cars of the defendant, no damages are recoverable, on the ground that the company owed
the plaintiff "no duty to protect her from fright" Why not? It owed her a
duty to protect from contusion, fracture of limb, pain. Why not from fright?
But the suit was really for damages for the physical consequences of
fright. No sane man can see why the intervention of fright as a nexus between the shock and the physical disablement, should cause the latter to
cease to be a ground of recovery.
We think the doctrine of Cowan v. Western U. Telegraph Co., 64 L. R.
A. 545 (Iowa) sensible, and for that reason
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
TOLLER vs. CAPER.
Trespass--Libel-"Blaeklisting"of merchants by member of a credit association.
STA.TEMENT OF THE CASE.

The facts are sufficiently set forth in the charge of the Court of Common
Pleas.
Lewis for the plaintiff.
If the defendant and the person to whom the libelous statement was made,
have corresponding interests in the subject of the communication, it may be
privileged, but such privilege will not avail the defendant if he was actuated
by malice. McIntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. 52.
Lindley for the defendant.
Contended that the communication was privileged.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

HICKS, J. :-The facts in the case before us are as follows: Caper, a member of Fruit Dealers' Association, whose by-laws require any member to notify
the other of any failure by any purchaser of fruit to pay for it, notified them
that he had sold $150 worth of fruit to Toller, who had refused to pay. The
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result was that, as the by-laws required, all the other members declined to
furnish fruit to Toller and thus ruined his business, that of retailing fruit.
This is a trespass for libel, the declaration alleging malice, denying that Toller
owed anything to Caper, etc. The evidence showed that Toller did owe $150.00
to Caper, but also that Caper used the notice to the society as a means of coercing the payment, and not merely to warn the other members.
Libel, as Lord Camden defines it, is "a censorious or ridiculing writing,
pictures or signs made with a mischievous or malicious intent toward government, magistrates or individuals." May's Crim. Law, p-14 7. In Barr v.
Moore, 87 Pa. 385, we find "any malicious publication, written, printed or
painted, which by words or signs tends to expose a person to contempt, ridicule, hatred or degradation of character is a libel; and any person may recover
damages for such libel." In the present case Caper was exposing or publishing by his notices the circumstances in which Toller was situated, i. e., of his
debtor, and by such publication exposed his character to ridicule, contempt,
hatred and degradation. For, indeed, a delinquent in his business relations
with others is not considered as a safe and desirable individual for the carrying
on of any future dealings. This publication may not only have injured his
character, but also his business success; as seen by the facts, it has ruined
him. In Price v. Conway, 134 Pa. 340, "any written words published of
another which have a tendency to injure another in his office, profession, calling or trade, are libelous."
We readily see that under ordinary circurnstances these words published by way of the notice to the association would
be libelous per se; for in Hayes v. Press Co., 127 Pa. 642, we again find that
any written or printed words which are injurious to a person in his office,
profession, or calling, which impeach the credit of a merchant or trader, by
imputing to him insolvency or even embarrassment, are libelous.
Odgers on
Libel, 19, 29, 80, 81 and authorities there cited. Thus far, we find that Caper
has violated the definitions as found, in all their particulars. He published
Toller's financial embarrassment in the notice he sent to his fellow-members.
The result of this publication followed rapidly in its wake and we find
Toller injured to the extent of his business ruin.
We find that the authorities say that malice is essential to an action for
libel. This malice, as is needed for success in an action for libel when no lawful excuse exists for the libel, and where there is no spite or ill-will or disposition to injure others, is not the malice as found in ordinary conversation, but
is malice in a special and technical sense. Every libel having the other qualities of a libel, if wilful and unprivileged, is in law malicious. Publication
of words actionable in themselves is sufficient evidence of legal malice. This
legal malice is a fiction of law created by judicial legislation and exists where
a wrongful act is done intentionally. Again, it is presumed by law whenever
an individual acts regardlessly of his public duty, or duty which lie owes to
society and its constituents. This question of legal malice is for the decision
of the court and they construe, while presuming this legal malice, that the defendant intended the consequences which naturally resulted therefrom. In
Odgers on Libel, 2645, and Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, we find, that where
defendant published words which injured plaintiff's reputation or business,
he must be taken to have intended the consequences naturally resulting therefrom, and question whether defendant acted maliciously or not, should not
be left to jury unless occasion be privileged.
So far Caper is liable for all his actions and if the evidence proved nothing
more, the court would direct verdict for the plaintiff without further discussion of subject. By the above authorities, Caper has unlawfully published
expressions detrimental to the plaintiff, resulting in great injury, his ruin.
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One more question presents itself to our attention, i. e., the question of
whether this publication or communication was privileged. We think it was,
for in McIntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. 52, we find, that where defendant in a
libel suit and person to whom statement was made, have corresponding interests in the subject of the communication, it may be privileged, but such privilege will not avail defendant where under evidence jury finds he was actuated
by malice. The association was formed for mutual protection, that each of
the members notify the other of delinquent debtors. They stood in a business
and confidential relationship of one another, and so the court finds the communication privileged. In 111 Pa. 404, Briggs v. Garrett, it was held that a
communication to be privileged must be made upon a proper occasion, from
proper motive and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause. When
so made, in good faith, the law does not imply malice from the communication itself as in ordinary case of libel.
The statement concerning Toller's indebtedness was true, and in this case
we hold that truth is an adequate and complete defense if no malice, i e.,
all
The Act of April 11, 1901, sect. 2; "In
actual malice, is shown.
civil actions for libel, the plea of justification shall be accepted as an adequate
and complete defense, when it is pleaded and proved to satisfaction of the
jury, under the direction of the court as in other cases, that the publication is
substantially true, and is proper for public information or investigation and
has not been maliciously or negligently made." We think that in this case,
legal malice is not implied and that the burden of proof of actual malice is
upon plaintiff.
This publication is not absolutely privileged, but qualified, in that sense,
which makes it the duty of the court to instruct thejury that it is privileged and
because of such privilege no presumption of malice arises from mere fact of
publication, but malice must be proved as a fact in the cause before plaintiff
can recover. Press Co., Ltd., v. S. N. Stewart, 119 Pa. 584. In 111 Pa. 404,
supra, it was held that the question of good faith, belief in truth of statement
and existence of actual malice are questions for jury.
Since we believe that the question of actual malice must be decided by the
jury, by the authorities above cited, we will not discuss the usage, by the defendant, of this notice to coerce plaintiff, but charge the jury that if they think
that, by the evidence as they heard itand understood it, the defendant was actuated by evil design, revenge, active malevolence, intent to injure plaintiffin his
business or person, by publishing that which although the truth, injured him,
then to find judgment for plaintiff, otherwise, if they find no actual malice,
then for defendant. If they find judgment for plaintiff, they must at least
give nominal damages, but beyond that, it is for them to say what should be
allowed by way of compensation or punishment, either or both.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

It was a fact that Toller owed $150.00 to Caper. When the latter told the
members of the association that the former owed, he told the truth. Why
then, should he be liable for anything?
The members of the association had a right to say whether they would or
would not sell to a debtor. The fact that they had declared, in advance, that
they would not, and that therefore Caper expected and intended them not to
sell to Toller, in consequence of his information, would not make his conduct.
actionable. We are not prepared to say that if A tells B a fact concerning C
in consequence of which telling, he foresees and intends that B will refrain
from doing something beneficial to C, he exposes himself to any suit for dam-
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ages. B may condition his voluntary conduct towards C upon any fact he
chooses, and A should not be legally responsible for giving information of this
fact, with a view to B's refraining from certain conduct toward C.
While the purpose of Caper was, immediately to induce the members of
the association to refrain from dealing with Toller, his ulterior purpose was,
it seems, composite; viz, not merely to save these members from loss in consequence of any credit they might, unless warned, extend to Toiler, but also, to
constrain the payment of the debt to himself, because otherwise Toller could
not hope for a resumption of dealings with him on the part of the members of
the association. To desire to save others from loss from crediting a person disinclined to pay his debts, is not unworthy, or reprehensible. Nor are we able
to be censorious towards one who while having this altruistic feeling, experiences another not entirely altruistic, that, namely, of desiring to obtain
payment of his debts.
We are not willing to say that the act of telling the truth of another in
order to induce others to abstain from business intercourse with him in order
to constrain him to pay his debts, is actionable. Nor is it for the jury to interpret this conduct into malide. Dissenting from the instructions to thejury,
we affirm the judgment for the defendant. Affirmed.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK vs. THRASHER.
Bills and notes-Accommodation indorser-Pincipaland surety-Discharge
of principaldebtor-Collateralsecurity-Subrogation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Tepee made a note for $500 payable to Thrasher, which the latter
endorsed to accommodate Tepee, who obtained the money on it from plaintiff
bank. Before this note became due, Tepee gave his own note directly to the
bank for $500, with a warrant to confess judgment, paying in advance the
discount. This was given as collateral security for the first note, at whose
maturing demand was made on Tepee for payment and notice of non-payment
given to Thrasher. The judgment entered on the second note failed to realize
more than $200. This is assumpsit for the balance.
I. 0. Stewart for the plaintiff.
Holder may apply collateral to the debt and then sue for the remainder.
McQueen's Appeal, 104 Pa. 602.
Clark for the defendant.
Indorser released by extension of time to the principal debtor.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

WALLIS, J. :-This is assumpsit by the holder of a promissory note
brought against the indorser of said note. This is the proper form of action in
which to bring such suit. Eilsworth v. Brewer, 28 Mass. 315.'
Tt can not be objected that Thrasher, the defendant in the case, was a
mere accommodation indorser, and that therefore, since the ifldorsement was
wholly without consideration the gratuitous indorser cannot be sued thereon.
4 Dallas 275; 13 Pa. 273; Mann v. McDonald, 10 Watts 270; 6 Peters (U. S.)
69; 4 Wharton 268; 11 S. & R. 388 ; 8 Conn. 237; 11 Conn. 38S. Whether the
holder of the note lnows of such want of consideration, is immaterial. It is a
well established rule of our commercial law, established upon reason and
sanctioned by long and universal usage. Ross v. Jones, 89 U. S. 584.

THE FORUM

221

However, in the case of an indorser certain prescribed rules must be followed. The holder of the note cannot sue him without first, a failure on the
part of the maker to pay when the note becomes due, and second, due demand
and notice served on the indorser. Ross v. Jones, 89 U. S. 584 ; Warner v.
Beardsley, 8 Wendell 195; 4 Dallas 151, 162. What is proper notice is a question for the court, and whether the facts were such as constituted this notice
and demand are for the jury. But our statement of facts assert that oil maturing of the note, demand was made on the maker and notice of its non-payment given to the defendant, the indorser. The point as to whethericwas due
notice, then cannot be raised in dispute.
In Ross v. Jones, 89 U. S. 584, the court said : "Mere indulgence or delay
by the holder to sue the maker will not discharge the indorser. There is no
obligation to use diligence. If the holder of a promissory note be called upon
by the indorser after the note becomes due, to prosecute the maker, of whom
the amount due might then be collected, but who afterwards becomes insolvent and he neglects to do so, this will not discharge the indorser. The indorser contracts with the indorsee that if, when duly presented, the note is not
paid by the maker, be, the indorsee, will, upon due and reasonable notice
being given him of the dishonor, pay the same to the indorsee or other
holder." But here justice and equity or good faith on the part of the holder,
the plaintiff, make his position all the stronger. He might have waived the
right to sue on the collateral (Hunter v. Afoul, 57 Pa. 360 ; 98 Pa. 13 ; Powell
Case, 8 W. N. C. 293,) and, have sued directly on the principal debt; and,
since there was default in payment on the part of the real debtor, the defendant would have been subjected to a suit for the whole amount of the debt, instead of merely a portions as here, if the holder had so chosen. He then cannot complain, but his position is all the better as the result of the plaintiff's
procedure in first suing on the collateral. As judgment on the collateral,
which was a note of the debtor himself, could realize but $200, it would be a mere
farce and useless as well as unnecessary litigation for him to sue the debtor for
the residue of the debt under the principal note. His only remedy was to sue
the defendant for the. remaining $300. Lisby v. O'Brien (4 Watts 141) is a
case in which the relation of the parties, so far as a recovery in this suit is concerned, were identical with the present. In accordance with the decision there
given, and the principles above mentioned, judgment must be given for the
plaintiff for the amount of $300 and costs.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The only defense that Thrasher could possibly make is, that the acceptance
by the plaintiff, of the note of Tepee, as collateral security, was an implied extension of the time of payment of the note endorsed by Thrasher. They were
for the same debt, and the time of payment of the second was subsequent to
that of the payment of the first.
An agreement of a creditor with a principal debtor, to extend the time,
the surety not agreeing, will discharge the surety, unless the creditor expressly stipulates that his right of recourse against the surety shall not be affected. When he so stipulates, lie does not violate his contract in suing the
surety, although by so doing, he induces the surety, on paying the debt, to
sue the principal before the expiration of the extended time. There was no
such stipulation in this case. The indorser for accommodation of the maker,
must, with respect to the application of this rule, be deemed a surety. Was
there then an agreement to extend the time ?
The agreement when the second note wasgiven was not, as in Bishop's Estate, 195 Pa. 85, that it should be the primary note, and that the first note
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should be to it as a collateral security. On the contrary, the second note was
given and received as collateral to the first note. The mere reception of it
does not imply an agreement to extend the time within which the first note
should be paid. Bank v. Marshall, 9 Super 621; Kemmerer's Appeal, 102
Pa. 558.
Thrasher has had advantage of the collateral note inasmuch as by means
of it, the debt has been reducd by $200. When he pays the note on which he
is sued, he will be entitled to subrogation to the bank's judgment against
Tepee.
Judgment affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH vs. SEARS AND HUNT.
Homicide-Suicide-A ttempt to take one's own life-Duty and liability of one
present, aiding and abetting the attempted suicide.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant was indicted for an attempt to murder under the following
facts: being despondent over business affairs, Sears made an attempt to commit suicide by taking a dose of "Rough on Rats," but his life was saved by
the intervention of medical aid. Hunt is joined in the indictment, having at
the instance of Sears procured the poison, knowing the latter's purpose and
having been present when the poison was taken.
Sorber for the Commonwealth.
Hunt is an accessory before the fact. 4 Blacks. 34-39 ; Act 31 Mar. 1860,
P. & L. Dig., col. 1100 ; Com. v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136; Oom. v. Knapp, 9 Pick.
496; Coni. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356; Com.v. Green, 13 Mo. 382.
Wallis for the defendant.
Hunt's actions do not constitute an attempt.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BRADDOCK, J.:-The attempt of Sears in this case was an attempt to
commit suicide. An indictment for an attempt to murder does not lie against
one who attempts suicide in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Wright, 11
Dist. Rep. 144. This rule is followed in Massachusetts also. Com. v. Dennis,
105 Mass. 162. In England it was formerly held self-murder and punished by
a denial of Christian burial and a forfeiture of goods and chattels to the crown,
4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 189, but is now held a misdemeanor at common
law. Rex v. Burgess, 4 Meus 1545; Regina v. Doody, col. 1564 Meus, vol. 4.
In New York an attempt to commit suicide is made a crime by statute, but
we have no such statute in Pennsylvania. The Act of 1860, P. L. 442, pro.
vides that if on trial of anyone charged with any felony or misdemeanor it
shall appear that he did not commit offense, but was guilty of attempt to commit same, but if the temporal offense of suicide was expressly abolished by
Constitution of 1795 and re-adopted 1838 and 1874, suicide is not a crime.
Therefore Act 1860 does not apply.
As to Hunt, he procured the poison, knowing latter's purpose, and was
present when poison was taken. Act of 1860, March 31, shall administer or
cause to be administered any poison or other destructive thing with intent to
commit murder $1,000 and to undergo confinement 7 years. "No intent."
Act of 1876: "If any persons shall attempt to administer any poison or
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other destructive thing with intent to commit murder, he shall, although no
bodily injury be effected, be guilty of felony and sentenced to pay fine $1,000
and 7 years imprisonment."
These do not apply because no murder and he did not attempt to administer poison.
Intent differs from attempt in that attempt conveys idea of physical act.
Kate v. Marshall, 14 Ala. 414.
In all cases of poisoning in Pennsylvania intent must be shown either by
or from the declarations of the accused, and from the relations of the parties
prior to and up to time of taking poison. 114 Pa. 300 ; 72 Pa. 60.
Should have intent before convicted of attempt. Coin. v. Clark, 10 Pa. C.
C. 444; 20 Phila. 396; Myers v. State of Conn., 1 Conn. 504.
It seems to furnish poison or cause any person to be furnished with poison
is criminal only where covered by statute. LaBeau v. People, 34 N. Y. 233;
Johnson v. State, 92 Ga. 36; Coin. v. Quinn, 50 Bail. 134.
In Corn. v. Bowen, urged by the District Attorney, the defendant was
solicited by prisoner to commit the act. No solicitation here.
It is said in an old English case, Marlin v. Ayliffe, Cro. Jac. 134, it was
one's duty to interpose to save a life from being taken, but no conviction
could surely be had if one map refuses to prevent another from taking his
own life. It is a moral duty, but not a legal one.
Both prisoners should be discharged.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Suicide is not murder. Consisting as it does in death, intentionally inflicted on one's self, the victim and the slayer are alike beyond the reach of
human vengeance. ro call it a crime would merely be an impotent stigmatization of it.
It would not follow that the unsuccessful attempt to kill one's self would
not be a crime. Itwas held to be such at common law in Regina v. Doody, 6
Cox C. C. 463; Beale's Cases, 261; Commonwealth v. Merik, 123 Mass. 170;
Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Dist. 144. In Massachusetts, the attempt to
commit suicide was held, in Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162, not to
be an indictable offense, because the statutes intended to supersede the common
law did not make it so. It is hardly necessary to say that if killing one's self
is not murder, the attempt to kill one's self is not an attempt to murder. Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Dist. 144.
But even in jurisdictions which do not hold that self-killing is murder (and
no jurisdiction so holds), it has been held that one who procures another to kill
himself, and is present at the doing of the act, e. g., the hanging-Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356; or the drowning-Rex v. Tyson, Rens. & R.
523; or the taking of poison-Regina v. Alison, 8 Carr. & P. 418 ; Regina v.
Jessop, 16 Cox C. C. 201 (cited 21 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 99) ; Regina v. Stormouth, 61 P. J. 729 (21 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 99), is guilty of murder. Suicide
is not a crime of any grade in Massachusetts or in Ohio. Yet one who gives
poison to another in order that the latter may take it, the latter taking it in
his presence, is guilty of murder in Ohio-Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 165;
and one who advises another to hang himself, and who is present when the
latter, in consequence of the advice, hangs himself, is guilty of murder in
Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356. The consent of the
deceased, the free co-operation of the deceased, dods not exempt the adviser,
aider and abettor from the guilt of murder. Cf. Wharton, Homicide, 269, who
remarks: Consent "is no defense to an indictment for murder, for no one can,
by consenting, validate the taking of his own life."
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In some of the cases cited the prisoner advised the deceased to kill himself.
Bowen (in Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356), who occupied a cell adjoining that in which X was confined, who, the following day, was to be executed, advised X to hang himself. X acted on the advice, and thus cheated
the gallows. Bowen was held guilty of murder, if his advice caused the selfhanging. In other cases, two persons have agreed to commit suicide together,
i. e., each to kill himself at the same time. One has succeeded, and the other
has not. The latter has been held sufficiently causally related to the death of
the other to be guilty of murder. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 165; Rex v.
Tyson; Regina v. Alison; Regina v. Jessop; Regina v. Stermouth, supra.
Though for various reasons it might be good policy not to criminalize the
attempt to kill one's self, or the killing of one's self, it would be singular if the
same exemption were extended to others who persuaded, or aided, one to kill
himself. The same reasons would not be apposite. The half-crazy, despondent, suffering, hopeless man may well be dispunishable for his act directed to
himself, while the other who counsels and assists him should be the subject of
the sternest condemnation. It is not yet clear that it is to the interest of the
State that men and women shall kill themselves in considerable numbers.
That the number of self-killers would be largely increased if no punishment
were incurred, by helping or otherwise encouraging them to kill themselves,
can scarcely be doubted. The absence of legislation upon the subject is a rather
good indication that the common law is supposed to penalize these acts. Thereis no legislation repealing this part of the common law.
The only question to consider, we think, is, would Hunt, in a legal sense,
have been the cause of Sears' death had that death ensued? Hunt, at the instance of Sears, and knowing Sears' purpose to kill himself, procured the
poison, delivered it to Sears, and was present when Sears swallowed it. If
verbal advice makes the adviser a cause, if agreement by A with B to commit
a concurrent suicide, makes A, who does not die, a cause of B's death, surely
procuring for Sears, at his request, and with knowledge of his purpose, the
poison which killed him, would make Huntthe cause of his death. HadSears
died, we doubt not that Hunt would have been guilty of murder.
If, then, the putting of the poison into Sears' hands, followed by his swallowing it, and by his actually killing himself, would have made Hunt a murderer, that is, if the act of swallowing, and the result, death, would have been
imputable to Hunt, the act of swallowing, when not followed by death, must
be imputable to him. That a swallowing of poison with intent to kill one's
self is an attempt, no one would question. The attempt to kill must therefore
be imputable to Hunt. As the acts of Sears are Hunt's acts, for the purpose of
making him a murderer, so are they his acts for the purpose of making him an
attempter of murder. He put the poison into Sears' hands in order that Sears
might take it for the purpose of killing himself. He attempted, therefore, to
kill Sears.
It follows that there was error in discharging Hunt. There was none in
discharging Sears. As his self-killing would not have been murder, his acts
done in order to self-kill are not an attempt to murder.

JONES vs. LEROW.
Contracts-Options-Offer-Revocationof offer-N!otice of revocation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jones applied to Lerow, a merchant, to purchase of him a lot of goods, and
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desired to know their price. Lerow named his cash price for the goods. This
was on 8th of October, 1903.
Lerow gave Jones the right to refuse the goods until 12 o'clock the following 10th day of October, at which time he promised he would have the goods
ready.
The next day Lelow learning that Jones had made similar arrangements
with other merchants on goods similar, sold his goods at ail advance..
Jones was on time at Lerow's place of business and tendered the amount
agreed upon and demanded the goods. Lerow having sold the goods, declined
to deliver. Jones brings this action to recover damages for Lerow's nonperformance.
Menges for the plaintiff.
Plaintiff had no notice of revocation of offer. The offer must be regarded
as having been continually open until the time of demand, which demand
consumated the contract and made revocation impossible. Hamilton v. Ins.
Co., 5 Pa. 339; Pollock on Contracts, p. 26 ; Clark on Contracts, p. 50.
Reno for the defendant.
An option on goods unsupported by a consideration and not under seal
may be withdrawn at any time. Bosshardt v. Wilson Co., 171 Pa. 109;
Dreason v. Mullin , 15 Pa, 200; Vincent v. Oil Co., 165 Pa. 402. Notice not
necessary where goods disposed of. Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653. Acceptance
must precede rev8cation.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
REESER, J.:-In the absence of sufficient notice or knowledge of the revocation, the offer of Lerow, continues open and will be turned into a binding
promise by its acceptance.
It seems that the common ls v insisted upon a consideration, or a paper
with a seal attached, when an offer was made, granting to a party a certain
time within which he is to be entitled to decide, whether he will accept it or
not, in order that the party making such offer is not at liberty to withdraw it
before the lapse of the appointed time. Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term R. 653, cited
in Clarke on Contracts, p. 51. This case held that, where an offer gives a
specified time within which it may be accepted, an acceptance within that
time without notice that the offer has been revoked, does not bind; that is to
say, that notice of the revocation is not necessary. In referring to this case,
Fletcher, J., in Boston & Maine Railroad v. Bartlett, 57 Mass. 224, stated "If
the case has not been directly overruled it has certainly in later cases been
entirely disregarded, and cannot now be considered any authority."
In the present case it does not appear that Jones had knowledge that
Lerow had sold the goods before he had tendered the amount agreed upon and
demanded the goods.
Without such notice, when the offer was accepted, the minds of the parties
met, and the contract was complete. Hamilton v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Pa.
339, and the acceptance by the plaintiff constituted a sufficient legal consideration for the agreement on the part of the defendant..
Lerow must be considered in law, as making during every instant until
12 o'clock, October 10th, 1903, the same offer to Jones, the plaintiff, and that
the contract was completed by the acceptance of it; unless Jones before acceptance has received notice *ofrevocation on the part of Lerow. When the
contract has been made absolute by the acceptance of the understanding, the
contract becomes mutual and capable of enforcement by either party. The
acceptance of the offer was therefore binding upon Lerow from the moment
Jones demanded the goods.
Second the damages. "When a contract to deliver goods, at a certain
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price is broken, the proper measure of damages in general is the difference between the contract price and the market price of such goods at the time when
the contract was broken, because the purchaser, having the money in his
hands, may go into the market and buy."
Barrow v. Arnard, 8, 2 B. 595,
609; Billneyer v. Wagner, 91 Pa. 92 and 149 Pa. 274.
The market value of property is established when other property of the
same kind has been the subject of purchase and sale to so great an extent and
in so many instances that the value becomes fixed. Sloan v. Baird, 162 N. Y.
327 ; 56 N. E. 752.
In assessing the damages in Billmeyer v. Wagner, 91 Pa. 92, the jury were
instructed that they may take into consideration, the loss, trouble and expense to which plaintiff was subjected by reason of defendant's default, and
make a fair allowance for the same.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Jones paid nothing to Lerow for "the right to refuse the goods." The
latter could therefore withdraw the offer at any time, upon notice to Jones.
Bosshardt Co. v. Crescent Oil Co., 171 Pa. 109. Within the time specified for
the acceptance Jones appeared before Lerow, tendered the money and demanded the goods. "ILerow having sold the goods, declined to deliver" them.
But, did Jones' demand precede Lerow's declination, or did the declination
precede the demand? The burden of showing the precedence of the demand,
is upon Jones, the plaintiff. He has not destinctly shown it. The demand
may have been anticipated by the declination, by a half minute or a minute.
But let us concede that it sufficiently appears that there was an appreciable precedence, a precedence by a half minute or a minute, of the acceptance
to the refusal. What will be the result ?
Lerow had in fact disposed of the goods, and had in fact ceased to be willing to be bound by Jones' acceptance. This, we opine, is unimportant.
Cooke v. Oxley, 3 Term R. 653, may imply that such change of nmind, expressed in the act of sale, will prevent the effectual future acceptance of the
offer, will practically withdraw the offer. If it does so, it is but to be considered as embodying the present law.
But the question before us is, is a revocation of the offer, which is practically simultaneous with acceptance sufficient to prevent the acceptance from
making a contract? ft is clear that up to this time, Jones has done nothing
the doing of which he can charge to Lerow. If he has neglected other offers,
in expectation of closing with this, he has done so, with knowledge that he
might be overtaken at any moment, by a recall of the offer. Nothing that
Jones has done before the interview, can therefore be a barrier to Lerow's revocation. If between the notification of the acceptance and of the revocation
of the offer, Jones had done anything, or might have done anything, that
would involve him in loss, if Lerow should not be bound, it would be reasonable to hold Lerow bound. If, on the other hand, allowing effect to the
revocation visibly would occasion no loss to Jones on account of anything
done by him since his acceptance, to hold Lerow bound would be togive effect
to a principle which should be practically valid only in cases in which its
operation might be necessary to avoid such loss.
Had Lerow withdrawn the offer thirty seconds, ten seconds, five seconds
before Jones completed his accepting phrase, nay, had this withdrawal
been exactly synchronous with the acceptance, It would have prevented the
rise of a contract. Why should the precedency by thirty seconds, or ten
seconds, or five seconds, of the acceptance to the revocation change the result;
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when the parties are face to face, the conversation is practically a unit, and
the circumstances negative the possibility of Jones having so changed his
relations between the acceptance and the withdrawal, that he would suffer in
consequence of that change, a detriment, were the revocation permitted to be
effectual ? When Jones began to speak, Lerow was under no duty to let him
have the goods. Why does the close of his sentence impose that duty, when
it is immediately followed by the expression of Lerow's dissent? Perhaps,
even before the completion of Jones' sentence, a frown, a smile of Lerow, a
shake of the head, showed him that Lerow was withdrawing the offer.
There must, it is true, be a time when the offer is turned into a promise.
We do not apprehend, however, any difficulty in the practical application of
this principle, if the doctrine is accepted that the acceptance of an offer which
is synchronous with its withdrawal is ineffectual, and that, if in the same interview, and without the intervening of any time in which other business acts
can be done by the accepting party, the offer is withdrawn, the acceptance and
the withdrawl are synchronous.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

CLEVELAND BASE BALL CLUB vs. HALLEY.
Equity-njuncion-Contractfor personalservices-Mutuality of remedy.
STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

Halley contracted with the Cleveland Base Ball Club to act in the capacity of pitcher and player for one year at a stipulated salary. He also agreed
to refrain from performing similar services during the said period for any
other club. The Cleveland Base Ball Club agreed in consideration of his services and his promises, to give Halley an opportunity at least once each week,
to display his abilities as a pitcher. Halley has since entered into a contract
with a rival club for similar services. The Cleveland Base Ball Club now
seeks to restrain Halley by the use of a bill in equity praying foran injunction.
McDonald for the plaintiff.
Mutuality of remedy does not require that each party to a contract should
have precisely the same remedy, either in form, effect or extent. Ball Club v.
Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210.
Hahn for the defendant.
Each party must have right to specific performance, or equity will not enforce. Bodine v. Glading, 21 Pa. 50; Mason v. Kline, 63 Pa. 335.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

RENO, J. :--It may be assumed as finally settled, that courts of equity will
enjoin the breach of a contract for personal services, when in order to render
the services agreed upon the promisor must possess special knowledge, skill
and ability. This is done by prohibiting the one enjoined from performing
similar services for another during the period of the contract. Phila. Base
Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210; Phila. Base Ball Club v. Hallman, 20 Phila. 276;
American Association Base Ball Club v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. C. R. 337. The case of
Phila. Base Ball Club v. Lajoie, supra,is the latest authority on the subject
and if it stands for anything at all, it must be regarded as an unequivocal repudiation of the doctrine laid down in Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6, and Harrisburg Base Ball Club v. Athletic Association, 8 Pa. C. C. R: 232, and an endorsement of the classical case of Lumley v. Wagner, 1 D. I. & G. 604; s. c. 1
Ames Cases on Equity 93. The cases go to the length of enforcing such con-
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tracts through equitable remedies, even though there is-no stipulation covenanting to refrain from performing similar services elsewhere, and the cases
wherein base ball players have been restrained at the suit of managers are so
numerous and so unanimous that it may besaid tobe virtually established that
the services contracted for are such as pre-suppose special knowledge, skill and
ability, and as such within the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Metropolitan
Exhibition Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 198 ; s. c. 7 L. R. A. 381; Baltimore Base Ball
Club v. Pickett, 78 Md. 375, s. c. 22 L. R. A. 690.
In the case at bar, the respondent not only agreed to do a certain thing, i.
e., render services as a base ball player to and with the complainant club for
one year, but he also agreed to a negative covenant, viz.: to refrain from playing with any other club during the said period. It is assumed that Halley is
a player of ability, of skill, and who, in common with many engaged in work
similar to his, enjoys a reputation as wide as his travels and a patronage
which materially increases the receipts of the complainant club. The respondent having contracted with another and a rival club for like services, the
complainant is in court to restrain him from executing the latter contract and
to fulfill the terms of his aforementioned negative covenant. Can it do so?
Courts of equity will not enforce an affirmative covenant to work in a
contract for services. The reason is obvious; even a court cannot compel an
idle or a recalcitrant man to work against his will. But a negative covenant;
one promising to refrain from working for another will be enforced by injunction. To that extent an injunction resembles a decree for specific performance
and some of the principles and doctrines concerning the latter have been
applied to the former. A decree for specific performance generally will not
be granted unless the contract shows that the parties have, what has been
This is likewise true of injunction where
termed, mutuality of remedy.
that writ is used to enforce contract obligations. The phrase "mutuality of
remedies" has been variously interpreted. In our own State the decisions lack
unity both in the meaning ascribed to it and the occasions of its application.
Some of our cases stand for the proposition that mutuality of remedy requires
that both parties to the contract have a right, upon the face of the contract, to
a decree of specific performance. Bodine v. Glading, 21 Pa. 50; Meason v.
Kaine, 63 Pa. 40. In others, notably in Grove v. Budges, 55 Pa. 516, it was
said that this phrase does not require that each party must have precisely the
same remedy against the other. The recent case of Phila. Base Ball Club v.
Lajoie, supra, seems to have gone even farther than most of the authorities,
and the contract in question was enforced when the court Lad satisfied itself
that each party had a possibility of enforcing all the rights agreed upon in the
treaty. The case distinctly denies that mutuality of remedy requires that
each party should have precisely the same remedy either in form, effect or extent. Even were it necessary to a decision in this case, we would not be disposed to reconcile these various enunciations, nor attempt to justify the evident departure from the well beaten track of stare decisis, made by the court
in the last named case.
Whatever version of the rule calling for mutuality of remedy is accepted
the result.must be the same. The bill cannot be sustained. There is no mutuality of remedy in any of the senses in which that phrase has been used or
defined. The contract stipulates that Halley was to be given an opportunity
at least once each week to display his talents in the position of pitcher. This
was part of the recited consideration for his services, and no doubt was one of
the facts which induced the respondent to enter into the contract. To a base
ball player this is a valuable franchise. All the glory of the base ball diamond
is coucentered upon the pitcher. Victories are won and lost as he is skilled or
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not. All eyes are upon him and if he is successful his name is on the lips of
admiring thousands. Captain, manager, players, all sink into oblivion compared to the fame of the pitcher. But, although binding in law, this covenant
is not enforceable in equity. To enforce it would be to insist upon the performance of an affirmative covenant, something no court of equity would attempt to enforce even with the aid of an injunction. To enforce it would
mean that the manager must be compelled to schedule games; he must hire
players and pay them; the players must be com pelled to play with and support Halley and a thousand and one details must be arranged and carried
out. The slightest deviation from duty by one of the players would deprive
Halley of a "fair chance," i. e., "of an opportunity to display his talents," and
in order that the offender be punished for violating the thundering anathema
of a court of equity we would probably be treated to the startling spectacle of
a dignified high sheriff transformed into a dust-covered umpire! Truly the
chancellor who would command the performance of a covenant requiring inent
to play ball, would assume a mighty burden and more than likely attain nothing more than fill his jail with a colony of contempts.
Nor has Halley an adequate remedy at law for the breach of that covenant. The damages cannot be estimated with anything like reasonable accuracy. They are speculative to say the least. Halley's remedy at law is just
as inadequate as is the complainant's. The latter is suing in equity on the
theory that the damages awarded in law would not compensate it. Halley is
in a like position as far as the law court is concerned and in a pre-eminently
worse situation when he seeks redress in a court of equity. Hence, there is
no mutuality of remedy. Only one party has a right to a decree for specific
performance and the other has only an inadequate remedy at law.
Bill dismissed.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT..

The questions presented by this case are, first, should equity attempt to
enforce a contract for personal services by enjoining the servant friom serving a
rival of his employer ? second, can the employer be compelled to retain a servant in his service by any similar process? and third, what bearing has want
of mutuality on these questions?
IfA contracts to serve B, and to serve no others, he has made two distinct
promises. A's failure to serve B will inflict a loss, if his services would have
been valuable, but his service of others will often inflict a distinct and greater
loss. By Halley's breach of his promise to play with the plaintiff club, the
club was deprived of an attraction. By his beginning to play with another
club the plaintiff club will be exposed to a distraction. Itis reasonable, therefore, that equity should stop this second injury, however powerless it may be
to stop the first. The first promise involves activity and agenuine effort to do
his best No earthly power can change a man's heart or alter his will. Punishment may induce a half-hearted performance, but it is not likely to create
much enthusiasm in the victim. But the second promise may be performed
by inactivity. The jail may guarantee full performance. This is the simple
reason why one promise is enforced and the other is not. There is no charm
in the negative form of expression. No magic can be effected by the injunction that could not be effected by the decree of specific performance. If Halley
had promised not to fail to play with tie plaintiffs, no injunction could restrain him from ceasing to play. Though the club may have expressly covenanted not to discharge Halley without cause, no injunction can be granted
to restrain a wrongful discharge. The mandatory injunction is never granted
in these cases. Davis v. Foreman, 3 Ch. 654.
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In forbidding Halley to play with the plaintiff's rivals the court may be
controlled by either of two motives. First, he may desire to stop the injury
resulting from his distracting the patrons of the plaintiff to the ball game of
the rival club. Second, he may desire to induce Halley to play with the plaintiff's club. The first is a legitimate motive. The second is illegitimate. If
the injury is the result of diversion of patronage, it should be stopped; otherwise not. De Mattos v. Gibson, 4 De. & J. 276. The reason is plain. The
court does not order Halley to play under threat of imprisonment, for this
would produce but a half-hearted service, worse than none at all. For the
same reason, it would not make the order under pain of fine. To forbid his
playing elsewhere in order to induce him to play with the plaintiff, is simply
to adopt another form of duress. Maybe we can starve him into playing, soliloquizes the court, or by imposing this cumulative fine (the loss of all
salary) reach his heart through his pocketbook, where we could not by solitary confinement. The increased severity of the penalty is supposed to infuse
the good-will and enthusiasm essential to efficient service. The folly of the
thing is manifest. Equity is not a court created to punish crimes, but to give
a man his specific rights. When it is powerless to give this, it should omit all
punishment. Simonton saw the point, and acted on it in the case of the Harrisburg Base Ball Club, 8 Pa. C. C. 337. The Lajoie case overlooks it.
When involuntary servitude was abolished there was public recognition of
the fact, that it is not for the best interests of society, that men should becompelled to maintain continuous personal relations with one another, when they
are not desirous of doing so. Every act that a court does for the professed
purpose of enforcing unwilling service is therefore vicious in its tendency and
deserving of condemnation. However, the Lajoie case has made the law for
this court, and unless we can distinguish the case at bar, we must give the
injunction, though no danger of injury from diversion appears from the statement of facts.
The learned court below is of the opinion that the contract lacks mutuality
of remedy and that it is on this account distinguishable from the Lajoie case.
He shows clearly that it would be folly to order the plaintiff to use Halley as
its pitcher. But whether an injunction could not be granted forbidding the
club to play ball without giving Halley the stipulated chance to pitch, he
does not consider. If our courts are to enforce the contract to serve, by imposing enforced idleness as the penalty for a failure to serve, why should not
the same weapon be used against the employer? We have found only two
cases on the point. In Johnson v. Shrewsbury, etc., 3 DeGex, M. & G., 914,
a railroad company had contracted to employ A in a certain position. A
sought to have the company enjoined from employing anyone else to do the
work he was to have done. In Brett v. East India, etc., 2 H. & M. 404, the A
company contracted to employ B as its broker and to place his name in all
advertisements of the company. It did not employ him and B sought an injunction against the publication of advertisements without his name therein.
In both these cases the acknowledged purpose of the injunctions sought was
to secure indirectly the performance of the contract to employ. The court
seemed horrified at the suggestion and emphasized the fact that a decree directing A to employ B is refused, not only because of the impossibility of enforcing a bonafide performance, but also because the very idea is revolting
that one man should be forced to employ another in whom he has lost confidence. Therefore, the end itself being undesirable, the court refused to try
to reach it by the round-about path suggested. After the Lajoie case, there
may be some doubt as to what our own Supreme Court would do in such a
case. It has approved the method of indirection, and it will likely prove as
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effective a weapon against a manager as against a player. Though the
manager may be in less danger of suffering the puigs of hunger, yet the loss
incident to the idleness of the entire club would likely produce its results in
the shape of a simulated change of heart.
There is this difference between the cases of the player and the manager.
The player expressly promised not to play with other clubs than the plaintiff's. The promise of the manager that the club would not play ball without
giving Halley his stipulated chance to pitch, if made at all, was made only
by implication. Every positive promise must of necessity contain an implied
promise not to do things inconsistent with the thing promised. Here Halley
was entitled to pitch only once a week. To forbid the club to play with other
pitchers for the other games of the week would be to forbid what they had a
perfect right to do. The only game that could be-properly stopped, as in violation of the contract, would be the last game of every week in, which Halley
had not been used as pitcher. Granting that this would be done, the remedy
would seem to be mutual. Neither manager nor player can secure direct
specific enforcement of the other's promise, but each may have an injunction
to aid him in reaching this end.
The question as to when an injunction will be granted to enforce an
implied negative covenant is one of considerable difficulty. If A contracts to
serve as B's newg correspondent in a certain town and B promises to give A
the exclusive right to publish the dispatches sent by B to A's town, the
promise of A contains no implied negative covenant that can be enforced,
while that of B does. A could not be induced to perform by a prohibition
against his sending his news to persons other than B, for the contract left him
free to do so. B could be enjoined not to send its dispatches to others than %.
for this was its implied promise. This will not be done, however, since B's
inability to secure performance from A deprives the contract of mutuality..
Iron Age Publishing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ala. 498.
Take a still better illustration. If A, an author, contracts to write a book
on a certain subject for B, a publisher, A cannot be forbidden to give the book
to C, for publication. The alternation of losing all profit from the publication
of the book would doubtless result in its being given to B, but this fact alone
will not justifly the use of the injunction. Had A given one copy of his
manuscript to B and another copy to C, he would still have kept his contract with B. Giving his manuscript to C is then not per se a breach of contract and it cannot be enjoined. Again, B could not be forced to publish the
book. Clearly he could not be forbidden to publish any other book till he had
published the bbok of A, for uo such promise could be fairly implied. Therefore, equity could give no relief to either party. Clarke v. Price, 2 Wils.
Ch. 157.
Again, suppose A contracts to buy from B all the supplies ofa certain character that he may use and B contracts to furnish them at fixed rates. Here,
while A might be enjoined not to buy from C, D and E, such an injunction
would not be granted, for equity could give A no aid if B should stop supplying the goods. Performance by B could not be secured by forbidding him to
sell to others than A for he never made any such promise. Hill v. Croll, 2
Phillips 60.
But if A contracts to sell specific goods of a peculiar character to B, he
necessarily promises to sell those specific goods to no other than B and a
threatened sale to C may be enjoined. R. R. Co. v. R. R. Co., 171 Pa. 284.
Such relief has been granted where the subject matter was bark, conveniently
available for the plaintiffs tannery. Vail v. Osborn, 174 Pa. 580. But this
doctrine does not apply to coal. Fothergill v. Rowland, L. R. 17 Eq. 132. A
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contract to supply one with gas is clearly of this nature. Corbet v. Oil City
Fuel Supply Co., 3 Super Ct. 19. A contract to pay money is as clearly not of
this nature. Therefore, a promise to pay before taking a trip will not justify
an injunction forbidding tile trip till the money is paid. Hanwell v. Gordon,
6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 481.
The discussion of want of mutuality in the Lajoie case has no bearing on a
case like this one. There this defense was supposed to grow out of the fact
that the manager reserved the option to terminate the contract at will, on giving a short notice. The manager had paid well for this very right. Want of
mutuality of obligation to perform is a good defense, simply because it amounts
to a want of consideration. But if one party pays cash in order that he may
be free, while the other party is bound, he has given an executed consideration,
and there is no real want of mutuality. On the exercise of the option an entirely new contract arises, and it, .being composed of mutual promises, is of
course valid. See Corson v. Mulvany, 49 Pa. 88, which is followed in the later
cases. There is no question of the mutuality of obligation in the case at bar.
Either party could clearly get damages if the other should fail to perform. The
only possible want of mutuality is that of remedy.
Is there want of mutuality of remedy in the case at bar? We think not.
Let us concede the position of the learned court below, that the managercould
not be compelled to perform either by a direct decree or indirectly by an injunction. What of it? The player is not asked to perform without security
for tile performance by the manager beyond the damages which ie could get
at law. He gets his due as he goes along. He does not complain that he has
not had his stipulated chance to pitch. When the manager defaults in this is
time enough for him to seek another club. The manager's breach would then
discharge the contract. However unenforceable in equity the promise of the
plaintiff may be, if he has fully performed it before he brings suit, it is idle for
the defendant to talk of want of mutuality. See Walker v. Coover, 65 Pa. 430.
So when the plaintiff is tendering full performance, the defendant cannot be
hurt by performing, and he may not plead want of mutuality. Of course,
where there is no contract, either in law or equity, as where one party is not
bound because of his defective execution of the contract, a tender of performance by such party cannot make a contract where none before existed. His
tender is an offer, no more. Bodine v. Glading, 21 Pa. 50.
But, when A has agreed to employ B in his store, the fact that A can stop
his business when lie pleases, and thereby deprive B of the employment
agreed on, is no reason why B should not be restrained from entering the
employment of A's rival, so long as A supplies B with the employment
promised. Rolfe v. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88, and Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
Union Co., Holmes 253. He assumes this risk when he enters into tile contract, as fully as does one who gives an option in return for a cash payment.
In one case the employer's breach may suddenly discharge the contract but
he may at least get damages. In the Lajole case the player was exposed to a
sudden discharge at any time without any redress in either law or equity.
The English courts have emphatically held that though the promises of the
plaintiff may not be of a kind-enforceable in equity, yet if the defendant's
promises can be enforced by injunction and justice can be done by a prompt
dissolution of the injunction tie moment the plaintiff fails to do his part, the
injunction should be granted. Stockes v. Wedderburn, 3 K. & J. 393.
In such a case a perpetual injunction is improper but there can be no
objection to granting an injunction limited to continue until the termination
of the contract by the breach of the plaintiff. See Martinsburg Bank v.
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Telephone Co., 150 Pa. 36. The judgment of the learned court below mbst,
therefore, be reversed and an injunction issued in accordance with this
opinion.
Judgment reversed.

BOOK REVIEW
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES. By Hannis Taylor, LL. D. Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing

Company, Rochester, N". Y.
Not the least interesting portion of this massive work is the "Preface,"
which, in over 60 pages, presents an outline of the history of the Supreme
Court, and of its leading decisions from its organization to the present time.
The sketch of the jurisdiction of this court is admirably clear, First in order
of treatment is the original jurisdiction, which has been seldom invoked except in controversies to which states have been parties. The chapter on interstate suits concerning boundaries is attractively written. The appellate jurisdiction is treated with respect to the courts of the District of Columbia, the
Court of Claims, the Court of Private Land Claims, the Inter-State Commerce
Commission, the Territorial Courts, the District Courts, the Circuit Courts,
the Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally the State Courts. Over 160 pages
are devoted to the sabject of procedure; and another 100 pages are occupied
with the rules of the Supreme Court, and practical forms.
There are a few blemishes. The citations are, unfortunately, inserted in
the body of the pages instead of foot notes. Some of the topics discussed are
more appropriate to a treatise on Constitutional Law than to one on
the subject indicated by the title. The history of the composition of the court
is confused with the analyses of its decisions. With the author's philosophisings we cannot always be satisfied. Precisely what e. g. he means when he
says that the court was the "inevitable outcome" of the "new system of limitations" on governmental power, it is hard to divine. There had been a Confederation without confederate courts, and it is quite conceivable that the closer
Union might have been without Union courts. The actual is the inevitable.
The intimation that the Supreme Court was intended to perform the function
of the Privy Council, in declaring acts of legislation void, is supported by very
slender evidence.
The work can be commended to all practitioners in the Federal Courts and
all students of political institutions, as distinctly better than any rival.

HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN UNITED STATES COURTS.

By Robert Jf Hughes.

West Publishing Co., St. Paul,Minn.

The scope of this book is very well expressed by its title. The various
courts and their jurisdictions, original or appellate, are described. The first
chapter deals with the sources of jurisdiction and with the law administered.
The statement is made in iteration of that of some of the decisions, that there
is no common law of the United States. It requires but little observation to
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detect how erroneous this statement is. Of course, when the United States
began to be there was no common law of them, but in the 116 years of their
existence a body of principles has obtained recognition by the courts precisely
as those which compose the so-called common law obtained recognition by the
English courts. No written law was ever yet complete enough to solve all the
practical problems that insist on solution, and principles drawn from elsewhere
must perforce be vouched. This is true of Federal courts and of state courts
alike. In 166 pages the district courts and their work are very lucidly discussed.
An almost equal space is allotted to the Circuit courts. Seventy-five pages follow on procedure in cases of original jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court of Appeals and of the Supreme Court is discussed in 70
pages, and procedure on error and appeal covers the remainder of the text.
An appendix presents the rules of the Supreme Court and the rules of practice
for courts of equity of the United States.
This book may be commended as one of the best of the Hornbook series.
Any intelligent lawyer, whether he expects ever to have a case in a Federal
Court or not, should be familiar with the outlines of the jurisdiction and procedure of such courts. We know no better means for the attainment of this
end than the careful perusal of this book.

